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FEAR AND LOATHING IN COLORADO: 
INVOKING THE SUPREME COURT’S 
STATE-CONTROVERSY JURISDICTION  
TO CHALLENGE THE MARIJUANA-
LEGALIZATION EXPERIMENT 
CHAD DEVEAUX* 
ANNE MOSTAD-JENSEN** 
Abstract: This Article asserts that states may invoke the Supreme Court’s 
original jurisdiction to challenge marijuana legalization in Colorado. The 
State’s introduction of marijuana into interstate commerce has reawakened a 
long-dormant body of constitutional law dealing with transboundary nuisance 
disputes between states. In making this argument, we distinguish our theory 
from the complaint lodged by Nebraska and Oklahoma with the Supreme 
Court. Nebraska and Oklahoma seek to enforce the Supremacy Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, contending that Colorado’s venture violates the federal 
Controlled Substances Act. In contrast, we assert that the Court should award 
damages to a prevailing state, using the Coase Theorem of market efficiency 
as its guide. Real-world application of this Theorem can be attained by impos-
ing a legal rule charging the nuisance with the damages it causes. If compel-
ling a polluter to internalize the cost of its pollution drives it out of business, 
then the enterprise was not the most economically efficient use of the proper-
ty. In contrast, if the polluter assumes responsibility for all the costs of the 
venture and still realizes a sufficient profit to stay in business, then its use of 
the land is most efficient. If this remedy is applied, the market will determine 
the success or failure of Colorado’s venture and will serve as a guide to other 
states in deciding whether it is worth emulating. 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2015, Chad DeVeaux & Anne Mostad-Jensen. All rights reserved. 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Concordia University School of Law; LL.M., Harvard Law 
School; J.D., University of Notre Dame Law School. 
 ** Head of Faculty Services, University of North Dakota School of Law; J.D., Santa Clara 
University School of Law; M.L.I.S., St. Catherine University. 
 We are gratefully indebted to our former student, Bryan V. Norton, who first proposed that a 
state could bring an original action seeking relief for transboundary harm caused by Colorado’s 
marijuana-legalization experiment. Many thanks are also due to our research assistant, Kate En-
terkine, for her outstanding work, to Jonathan Adler, Richard Ambrow, Jessica Berch, Neil Bu-
chanan, Mike Dorf, Ilya Somin, and Eugene Volokh for providing thoughtful comments on earlier 
drafts of this Article, and to the editors and staff of the Boston College Law Review for their hard 
work preparing it for publication. Any mistakes are ours. 
1830 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1829 
One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the States to each oth-
er, is that of equality of right. Each State stands on the same level with 
all the rest. . . . Yet, whenever . . . the action of one state reaches . . . into 
the territory of another state, the question of the extent and the limita-
tions of the rights of the two states becomes a matter of justiciable dis-
pute between them, and [the Supreme Court] is called upon to settle that 
dispute in such a way as will recognize the equal rights of both and at 
the same time establish justice between them.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Louis Brandeis famously observed that “[i]t is one of the happy inci-
dents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country.”2 In the wake of Colorado’s 
decriminalization of recreational marijuana,3 Justice Brandeis’s adage has 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Kansas v. Colorado (Kansas II), 206 U.S. 46, 97–98 (1907). 
 2 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 3 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16. In 2012, Washington voters also passed a referendum de-
criminalizing the sale of recreational marijuana. Jack Healy, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 
States, but Legal Questions Remain, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
11/08/us/politics/marijuana-laws-eased-in-colorado-and-washington.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/
26TJ-JKSN]. Oregon and Alaska followed suit in 2014. Niraj Chokshi, Alaska Legalizes Marijua-
na Today. Here’s How Its Law Compares to All the Others, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2015), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/02/24/alaska-legalizes-marijuana-today-heres-
how-its-law-compares-to-all-the-others/ [http://perma.cc/34Q4-DRGF]. Because Alaska does not 
share a border with any other state, we believe it is largely immune from the arguments we present 
in this Article. Oregon does not plan to permit the retail sale of recreational marijuana until the fall 
of 2016. Recreational Marijuana: Frequently Asked Questions, OREGON.GOV, http://www.
oregon.gov/olcc/marijuana/Pages/Frequently-Asked-Questions.aspx [http://perma.cc/KQ5D-JWLU]. 
Washington was more cautious and deliberative with its program than Colorado, delaying the 
implementation of recreational marijuana sales in order to explore safeguards that may limit diver-
sion out of the state. Gene Johnson, Bumpy Road for Marijuana Legalization in Washington, 
DENVER POST (July 1, 2014), http://www.denverpost.com/marijuana/ci_26064762/bumpy-road-
marijuana-legalization-washington [http://perma.cc/77DZ-XLBB]. Washington’s first licensed 
dispensary opened on July 8, 2014. Katy Steinmetz, Washington State Is Low on Legal Pot, TIME 
(July 1, 2014), http://time.com/2946014/marijuana-pot-legalization-washington/ [http://perma.cc/
SV2B-RNVK]. Due to Washington’s more rigorous licensing process and local ordinances only 
around eighty-five dispensaries are presently open. Washington State Growers Struggling to Sell 
Legal Marijuana, FOX NEWS (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/01/16/washington-
state-growers-struggling-to-sell-legal-marijuana/ [http://perma.cc/S8AK-EBFZ]. In contrast, when 
Colorado rolled out its commercial pot market in 2014, it promptly issued licenses to 348 retailers, 
covering all corners of the state. John Ingold, Colorado Issues First Licenses for Recreational 
Marijuana Businesses, DENVER POST (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_
24784227/colorado-issues-first-licenses-recreational-marijuana-businesses [http://perma.cc/TU5A-
B59B]. As the full scope of Oregon’s and Washington’s regimes remain to be seen, we have lim-
ited our analysis to Colorado’s program. If Washington’s or Oregon’s programs ultimately expand 
to a scale approaching Colorado’s, the arguments we present herein will apply with equal vigor to 
those states as well. 
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become a shibboleth frequently wielded by pot-legalization advocates.4 But 
the popular culture’s exuberant embrace of the marijuana-legalization ex-
periment,5 undoubtedly fueled by the immense wealth the industry—“Big 
Cannabis”6—promises to generate, ignores a crucial caveat to this oft-
quoted metaphor. The Constitution permits states to “try novel social and 
economic experiments” only when such measures come “without risk to the 
rest of the country.”7 
This is so because the Constitution imposes “an affirmative duty” on 
states to protect their neighbors from harm emanating from their territory.8 
                                                                                                                           
 4 E.g., Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 
UCLA L. REV. 74, 77 (2015) (arguing that “[u]nprecedented public support for legalizing mariju-
ana has emboldened Brandesian experimentation across the country”); Nathaniel Counts, Initiative 
502 and Conflicting State and Federal Law, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 187, 201 (2013) (“As one of the 
first two states to legalize marijuana after the passage of the [Controlled Substances Act], the 
citizens of Washington may see themselves as fulfilling the purpose of a federal system, where ‘a 
single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’” (quoting Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 
311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting))); Charles F. Manski, Drug Control Policy in an Uncertain World, 
91 OR. L. REV. 997, 1008 (2013) (arguing that “[t]he recent 2012 decisions by Washington and 
Colorado to eliminate state penalties for recreational use of marijuana” are a good example of 
Justice Brandeis’s mantra); Jacob Sullum, The Cannabis Is Out of the Bag: Why Prohibitionists 
Have an Interest in Allowing Marijuana Legalization, REASON, Aug. 1, 2013, at 12 (calling Colo-
rado and Washington “laboratories of democracy”); Joseph Tutro, States Are Making Their Own 
Decisions Regarding Whether Marijuana Should Be Illegal: How Should the Federal Government 
React?, 9 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 233, 244 (2013) (arguing that Colorado’s decriminalization of mari-
juana “is the ultimate ‘novel social and economic experiment[]’” (quoting Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 
311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting))); Michael Vitiello, Joints or the Joint: Colorado and Washington 
Square Off Against the United States, 91 OR. L. REV. 1009, 1028 (2013) (arguing that giving Col-
orado the “latitude to implement” its marijuana-legalization experiment exemplifies “Justice 
Brandeis’ dictum that the states are the laboratory for democracy”). 
 5 Marc Mauer, Welcome Dinner: “The Drug War and Its Social Implications,” 13 CHAP. L. 
REV. 695, 701 (2010) (stating that “we have marijuana being celebrated in popular culture”). As 
one commentator recently noted: 
Over the past several years, many commentators, including myself, have predicted 
that we are on the road to legalizing marijuana. More recently, with the passage of 
initiatives in Colorado and Washington “legalizing” marijuana, headlines in the 
mainstream media have echoed that view. For example, a CNN headline touted 
those initiatives as “the biggest victory ever for the legalization movement.” The 
Wall Street Journal ran a headline asking “Reefer Madness or Investment Oppor-
tunity?” with a clear implication that marijuana may provide a lucrative investment 
opportunity. 
Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1009–10 (citations omitted). 
 6 Rory Carroll, Big Cannabis: Will Legal Weed Grow to Be America’s Next Corporate Ti-
tan?, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jan/03/legal-
marijuana-colorado-big-tobacco-lobbying [http://perma.cc/URY2-TTBE]. 
 7 Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 8 Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025 (1983); accord Vermont v. New York, 
417 U.S. 270, 270–71 (1974); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co. (Tennessee Copper I), 206 U.S. 230, 
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Recognizing this principle, Nebraska and Oklahoma have sought to invoke 
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to challenge Colorado’s experi-
ment.9 Their complaint contends that “Colorado has created a dangerous 
gap in the federal drug control system” enabling marijuana to “flow . . . into 
neighboring states, undermining [their] own marijuana bans, draining their 
treasuries, and placing stress on their criminal justice systems.”10 Yet, rather 
than premising their claim on these personal injuries, they inexplicably 
chose to pin their suit on harms allegedly inflicted on the federal govern-
ment. 
Seeking to “enforce . . . the Supremacy Clause, Article VI of the U.S. 
Constitution,”11 Nebraska and Oklahoma contend that Colorado’s venture 
violates the federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), which bans marijua-
na nationwide.12 They charge that Colorado’s decriminalization of marijuana 
“roguishly facilitate[s] the dismantling of [federal drug] policy,”13 “under-
mines express federal priorities in the area of drug control and enforcement,” 
and “interferes with U.S. foreign relations and broader narcotic and psycho-
tropic-drug-trafficking interdiction and security objectives” thereby harming 
“a wide range of U.S. interests.”14 Asserting that they have been forced to rise 
to the federal government’s defense “[b]ecause the current federal administra-
tion seems unwilling” to do so,15 they pray for an order enjoining Colorado’s 
pot-friendly regime.16 
Nebraska’s and Oklahoma’s federal-supremacy suit suffers from a 
myriad of fatal deficiencies—they lack standing to represent the federal 
government’s interests,17 their complaint does not plead injury with the par-
                                                                                                                           
238–39 (1907); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 564–65 
(1851). 
 9 See Complaint at 1, Nebraska v. Colorado, 135 S. Ct. 2070 (filed Dec. 18, 2014) (No. 144 
ORG), 2014 WL 7474136, at *1; Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 2, 
Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 2070 (No. 144 ORG) [hereinafter Opening Brief]; Reply Brief in Support of 
Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 3, Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 2070 (No. 144 ORG) [hereinafter 
Reply Brief]. Nebraska’s and Oklahoma’s suit is currently in limbo. Supreme Court Rules dictate 
that the Court must grant states leave to file an original action. U.S. SUP. CT. R. 17. Last May, the 
Court deferred deciding whether it will hear the case, asking the U.S. Solicitor General to brief the 
issue. Nebraska and Oklahoma v. Colorado Pending Petition, SCOTUSBLOG (May 4, 2015), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/nebraska-and-oklahoma-v-colorado/ 
[http://perma.cc/K5E9-TRME]. 
 10 Complaint, supra note 9, at 3–4. 
 11 Id. at 1. 
 12 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012). 
 13 Reply Brief, supra note 9, at 2 (emphasis added). 
 14 Complaint, supra note 9, at 21 (emphasis added). 
 15 Opening Brief, supra note 9, at 10. 
 16 Complaint, supra note 9, at 28–29; see infra notes 388–401 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining Nebraska’s and Oklahoma’s prayer for relief). 
 17 See infra notes 213–253 and accompanying text (exploring why Nebraska and Oklahoma 
lack standing to represent the federal government’s interests). 
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ticularity required to invoke the Court’s original jurisdiction,18 and their 
prayer for injunctive relief runs afoul of the Tenth Amendment’s anti-
commandeering proscriptions.19 Yet, at its core their complaint comes tanta-
lizingly close to presenting a legitimate claim. A long-recognized body of 
law recognizes that the well-worn “laboratories of democracy” mantra does 
not insulate states from original actions sounding in nuisance.20 
Although states lack standing to represent federal interests in the su-
premacy of federal law, they may seek redress for transboundary nuisances 
committed by their neighbors. Accordingly, more than a century ago when 
Tennessee permitted copper smelters to release noxious gases into the at-
mosphere causing the “destruction of forests, orchards, and crops” in neigh-
boring Georgia, Justice Brandeis’s famous adage provided the Volunteer 
State no comfort.21 
The decision in that 1907 case, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, stands as 
a bulwark of the Supreme Court’s horizontal-federalism jurisprudence—the 
body of law protecting state polities from incursions by sister states.22 The 
Court unanimously recognized that while ultimate judgment of whether a 
state’s regulatory choices are “doing more harm than good to her citizens” 
is ordinarily reserved “for her to determine,”23 the Constitution bars states 
from undertaking endeavors that conscript the citizens or property of their 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See infra note 222 and accompanying text (noting that Nebraska’s and Oklahoma’s com-
plaint does not satisfy the heightened pleading standards required to invoke the Supreme Court’s 
original jurisdiction). 
 19 See infra notes 378–427 and accompanying text (asserting that the Constitution’s anti-
commandeering proscriptions deny the Court the power to compel Colorado to enact or enforce 
laws banning the possession or sale of marijuana). 
 20 Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1501, 1501–03 (2009). We first proposed that a sister state could invoke the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction to challenge Colorado’s regime under the federal common law of 
nuisance in a draft version of this Article that was distributed before Nebraska and Oklahoma filed 
suit. Therefore, this earlier draft did not discuss the merits of their federal-supremacy theory. 
 21 Tennessee Copper I, 206 U.S. at 236. The sulfuric acid fallout produced by the Tennessee 
smelting was so toxic that a huge swath of vegetation-less land remains at its epicenter to this day. 
Fred Pearce, How Hellish Smoke Gave Tennessee a Poisoned Desert, NEW SCIENTIST (June 7, 
2011), http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21028156.600-how-hellish-smoke-gave-tennessee-
a-poisoned-desert.html [http://perma.cc/HL8E-Z4T8]. 
 22 Although commentators have sacrificed untold forests addressing the issue of “vertical 
federalism”—the distribution of sovereign powers between the state and federal governments—
comparably little ink has been spilled analyzing the equally important field of horizontal federal-
ism. See Chad DeVeaux, Lost in the Dismal Swamp: Interstate Class Actions, False Federalism, 
and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1019 (2011) (arguing that “a 
vibrant ‘horizontal federalism’ jurisprudence . . . comprises an equally important component to 
defending” the [s]tates’ “‘residuary and inviolable’ . . . sovereignty” as does the Supreme Court’s 
“vertical federalism” case law (quoting N. Ins. Co. v. Chatham County, 547 U.S. 189, 194 
(2006))). 
 23 Tennessee Copper I, 206 U.S. at 239. 
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neighbors as guinea pigs in their experiments.24 Thus, Tennessee’s ability to 
embrace novel commercial endeavors was curbed by Georgia’s right to be 
free from harmful externalities—“side effect[s] of . . . economic activity, 
[that] caus[e] [neighbors] . . . to suffer without compensation.”25 
When it comes to transboundary externalities, the Constitution dictates 
that states are “not compelled to lower [themselves] to the more degrading 
standards of a neighbor.”26 This limitation on state power derives from the 
ancient maxim that embodies the law of nuisance—“sic utere tuo ut al-
ienum non laedas, that is, so use your own as not to injure another’s proper-
ty.”27 It is also inherent in the commitment to a republican form of govern-
ment.28 Although Tennesseans are empowered to determine for themselves 
whether the benefits of risky in-state innovations outweigh their costs, 
Georgians are “deprived of the opportunity to exert political pressure” upon 
Tennessee’s legislature “in order to obtain a change in policy.”29 Georgians 
are also denied any share in the revenue that might justify the costs of the 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See id. at 238–39. 
 25 Externality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). As one commentator observed: 
The standard example of negative externalities is that of spillovers like air pollution 
that are emitted from a factory having harmful effects on the surrounding environ-
ment and population. While the factory benefits from the ability to produce its goods 
without paying for pollution reduction measures, the population bears the cost of the 
pollution: they may have health problems due to the pollution, the value of their 
property may decrease, and so forth. 
Franz Xaver Perrez, The Efficiency of Cooperation: A Functional Analysis of Sovereignty, 15 
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 515, 527 (1998) (citation omitted). 
 26 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972). 
 27 Lussier v. San Lorenzo Valley Water Dist., 253 Cal. Rptr. 470, 473 (Ct. App. 1988); see 
Elwood v. City of New York, 450 F. Supp. 846, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying the maxim to the 
federal common law of nuisance), rev’d, 606 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1979); REBECCA M. BRATSPIES & 
RUSSELL A. MILLER, TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE 
TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 3 (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006) (identify-
ing as one of the Trail Smelter principles the idea that “one should use one’s own property so as 
not to injure another”); Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE 
L.J. 931, 953 (1997) (“In summing up the customary international law of transboundary pollution, 
contemporary publicists frequently say that it adopts the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
laedas.”); accord Tennessee Copper I, 206 U.S. at 238–39; Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 
R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1938) (stating that “under the principles of international law, as well as of 
the law of the United States, no [s]tate has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such 
a manner as to cause injury . . . to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein”). 
 28 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government . . . .”); see DeVeaux, supra note 22, at 1035 (arguing that the 
Constitution divests states of the authority to regulate activities outside their borders because 
“each sovereign governs only with the consent of the governed” (quoting Nevada v. Hall, 440 US. 
410, 426 (1979))). 
 29 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174 (1941). 
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endeavor.30 For these reasons, the Court declared the Tennessee smelting an 
interstate nuisance that violated the Constitution’s federalist covenant and 
ordered its abatement.31 
Tennessee Copper is just one of more than a dozen Supreme Court de-
cisions standing in judgment of state experiments alleged to produce trans-
boundary nuisances or deplete resources shared by multiple states.32 The 
Constitution expressly endows the Supreme Court with “original jurisdic-
tion” over such “Controversies between two or more States.”33 This “state-
                                                                                                                           
 30 A nuisance usually occurs where a landholder engages in acts that produce externalities that 
force neighbors to “share his burden”—the costs imposed by the acts—without receiving any 
“share [of the] profits.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *219. 
 31 Tennessee Copper I, 206 U.S. at 238–39. The offending gases were emitted by two private 
companies, not agents of the state. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co. (Tennessee Copper II), 237 U.S. 
474, 475–76 (1915). Nonetheless, the facts warranted the invocation of original jurisdiction. The 
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that an aggrieved neighboring state may invoke state-
controversy jurisdiction to abate nuisances committed by private actors acting with the knowledge 
and consent of their host state. E.g., Idaho v. Oregon, 444 U.S. 380, 385 (1980) (permitting Idaho 
to file a complaint against Washington for allowing private fishermen to take inequitable shares of 
fish from the Columbia and Snake Rivers); Vermont, 417 U.S. at 270 (permitting Vermont to file a 
complaint against New York to abate the discharge of pollutants into Lake Champlain by a private 
New York corporation); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 455–56 (1922) (permitting Wyo-
ming to file a complaint against Colorado for allowing two private corporations to draw inequita-
ble shares of water from the Laramie River). 
 32 E.g., Idaho, 444 U.S. at 385 (alleging Oregon and Washington allowed fishermen to take 
disproportionate shares of fish from the Columbia and Snake Rivers); Vermont, 417 U.S. at 270 
(accusing New York of polluting Lake Champlain); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 
662 (1931) (seeking to enjoin Massachusetts’s diversion of water from the Connecticut River); 
New Jersey v. City of New York (New Jersey II), 283 U.S. 473, 476–77 (1931) (seeking to enjoin 
off-shore garbage dumping by New York that caused trash to wash ashore on New Jersey beach-
es); New Jersey v. New York (New Jersey I), 283 U.S. 336, 341–42 (1931) (alleging New York 
drew an inequitable amount of water from the Delaware River before it entered New Jersey); 
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 399 (1929) (challenging Illinois’s diversion of water from 
Lake Michigan to the Mississippi River which substantially reduced water levels in the lower 
Great Lakes); Wyoming, 259 U.S. at 455 (alleging Colorado drew an inequitable amount of water 
from the Laramie River before it entered Wyoming); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 256 U.S. 220, 
221 (1921) (alleging Minnesota redirected water into Lake Traverse, causing flooding in North 
Dakota); New York v. New Jersey, 249 U.S. 202, 202–03 (1919) (seeking to enjoin New Jersey’s 
discharge of sewage into New York Harbor); Tennessee Copper I, 206 U.S. at 236–37 (alleging 
poisonous gas emanating from a Tennessee plant caused damage in Georgia); Missouri v. Illinois 
(Missouri I), 180 U.S. 208, 208–09 (1901) (alleging Illinois’s discharge of untreated sewage into 
the Mississippi River polluted drinking water in Missouri); South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4, 
9 (1876) (challenging Georgia’s obstruction of navigation on the Savannah River); Wheeling & 
Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 564–65 (alleging a low-hanging Virginia bridge over 
the Ohio River obstructed the passage of ships to ports in Pennsylvania). 
 33 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Congress has made the Court’s jurisdiction over such cases “ex-
clusive.” 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
1836 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1829 
controversy jurisdiction”34 serves “as a substitute for the diplomatic settle-
ment of controversies between sovereigns and a possible resort to force.”35 
The “cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the states to each 
other, is that of equality of right”—each “stands on the same level with all 
the rest.”36 Nonetheless, when “the action of one [s]tate reaches . . . into the 
territory of another . . . the question of the extent and the limitations of the 
rights of the two [s]tates becomes a matter of justiciable dispute between 
them.”37 The Constitution entrusts the Supreme Court “to settle” these dis-
putes “in such a way as will recognize the equal rights of both and at the 
same time establish justice between them.”38 
Supreme Court intervention is necessary because “[t]he states of this 
Union cannot make war upon each other . . . . They cannot make reprisal on 
each other by embargo. They cannot enter upon diplomatic relations and 
make treaties.”39 The Constitution likewise prohibits states from conducting 
customs inspections of containers, vehicles, and persons entering their terri-
tory.40 
Federal common law provides the rule of decision in original actions 
for nuisance.41 “[T]he elements of a claim based on the federal common law 
of nuisance are simply that the defendant is carrying on an activity that is 
causing an injury or significant threat of injury to some cognizable interest 
of the complainant.”42 Such claims “are founded on a theory of public nui-
                                                                                                                           
 34 Robert D. Cheren, Environmental Controversies “Between Two or More States,” 31 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 105, 106 (2014) (coining the term “state-controversy jurisdiction” to describe the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over controversies between two or more states). 
 35 North Dakota v. Minnesota (North Dakota II), 263 U.S. 365, 372–73 (1923). 
 36 Kansas II, 206 U.S. at 97. 
 37 Id. at 97–98. 
 38 Id. at 98. 
 39 Kansas v. Colorado (Kansas I), 185 U.S. 125, 143 (1902). 
 40 Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472–73 (1979). In Torres v. Puerto Rico in 1979, the 
Court confronted a Puerto Rico statute that authorized customs inspections of persons and articles 
arriving from the U.S. mainland. Id. at 466. The statute was intended to curb “the importation of 
firearms, explosives, and narcotics from the mainland.” Id. at 466–67. Puerto Rico asserted that 
because it is not a state, and because as an island “its borders . . . are in fact international borders 
with respect to all countries except the United States,” it was not subject to the restrictions that a 
state would be. Id. at 471–72. The Court rejected both contentions. First, it concluded that the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is subject to the same Fourth Amendment restrictions as the states. 
Id. Second, the Court held that “Puerto Rico is not unique because it is an island” as “neither 
Alaska nor Hawaii are contiguous to the continental body of the United States.” Id. at 474. Thus, 
Colorado’s neighbors are subject to the very same restrictions recognized by Torres. 
 41 E.g., Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 103–04; Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 241–42; RICHARD H. FAL-
LON, JR., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 287 (5th 
ed. 2003) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS]. 
 42 Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 781 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Illi-
nois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 165 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated, City of Milwaukee v. Illi-
nois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304 (1981)); accord Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 
2527, 2536 (2011) (identifying cases where the Court permitted states to sue to challenge activity 
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sance” and essentially mirror the common law of public nuisance familiar 
to property attorneys around the country.43 
Historically, the bulk of the transboundary nuisance actions heard by 
the Court involved pollution.44 Congress’s expansion of the Clean Air and 
Water Acts in the 1970s, which established uniform national air and water-
quality standards and invested the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) with jurisdiction to administer them, put an end to virtually all 
such cases.45 Consequently, generations of attorneys and Justices have ma-
triculated without any experience with this once-common species of Su-
preme Court litigation.46 Colorado’s embrace of the recreational marijuana 
industry has created a new form of transboundary pollution, reawakening 
this long-dormant field of constitutional law from its slumber. 
Unlike other state vice-legalization experiments such as gambling,47 
prostitution,48 and prize-fighting49—which involve actions undertaken at a 
                                                                                                                           
harmful to their citizens’ health and welfare); Tennessee Copper I, 206 U.S. at 238–39 (asserting 
the presence of a nuisance when “sulphurous fumes caus[ed] and threaten[ed] damage on so con-
siderable a scale to the forests and vegetable life . . . as to make out a case within the requirements 
[of nuisance]”); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(“Under federal common law, a public nuisance is defined as an ‘unreasonable interference with a 
right common to the general public.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (AM. 
LAW INST. 1979)). 
 43 Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 855; accord, e.g., U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d at 780–81 
(adopting the definition of public nuisance found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts to address 
interstate harms); Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 
1980) (“Thus, these plaintiffs, who have a right under federal common law to abate the pollution 
of interstate waters, have also suffered sufficient individual harm to sue for damages arising from 
that public nuisance.”), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Middlesex Cty. Sewage Auth. v. Nat’l 
Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
 44 E.g., Vermont, 417 U.S. at 270 (accusing New York of polluting Lake Champlain); New 
Jersey II, 283 U.S. at 476–77 (seeking to enjoin off-shore garbage dumping by New York that 
caused trash to wash ashore on New Jersey beaches); New York, 249 U.S. at 202–03 (seeking to 
enjoin New Jersey’s discharge of sewage into New York Harbor); Tennessee Copper I, 206 U.S. 
at 230 (alleging that poisonous gas emanating from a Tennessee plant caused damage in Georgia); 
Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 241–42 (alleging Illinois’s discharge of untreated sewage into the Missis-
sippi River polluted drinking water in Missouri). But see South Carolina, 93 U.S. at 9 (alleging 
that Georgia’s obstruction of navigation on the Savannah River constituted a nuisance); Wheeling 
& Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.), at 564–65 (holding that a low-hanging Virginia bridge 
over the Ohio River that obstructed passage of ships to ports in Pennsylvania constituted a nui-
sance). 
 45 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2532 (holding that the Clean Air Act preempts fed-
eral common law of nuisance with regard to interstate air pollution); Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 
314 (holding that 1972 Amendment to the Clean Water Act preempts federal common law of 
nuisance with regard to the pollution of interstate bodies of water). 
 46 See Robert V. Percival, The Clean Water Act and the Demise of the Federal Common Law 
of Interstate Nuisance, 55 ALA. L. REV. 717, 717 (2004) (asserting that “the federal common law 
of interstate nuisance” met “its ultimate demise following the enactment of the Clean Water Act”). 
 47 Although many states have loosened restrictions on gambling in recent years, Nevada re-
mains the only state where wide-open “gaming” is completely legal and exists in virtually every 
corner of its territory. See Jamisen Etzel, The House of Cards Is Falling: Why States Should Co-
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fixed location—Colorado’s initiative authorizes the trafficking of goods50 
that can easily cross state lines inside luggage,51 through the mail,52 or in the 
trunks of cars.53 In this way, marijuana legalization produces regional exter-
nalities that closely resemble pollution. Just as contaminants released into 
rivers flow across state lines,54 marijuana introduced into the stream of 
commerce from Colorado dispensaries will predictably flow into neighbor-
ing states through the simple expediency of placing lawfully purchased 
cannabis in vehicles which are then driven across state lines. And just as the 
                                                                                                                           
operate on Legal Gambling, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 231 (2012) (describing Ne-
vada as the nation's “most liberal licensor,” with over three hundred separately licensed gaming 
locations). During the early twentieth century, the State coupled this vice with another unconven-
tional law to attract revenues. As one commentator noted, “Nevada became the leading divorce 
destination in the early years of the Depression when it cut its residency requirement to six weeks 
and legalized wide-open gambling to entertain new residents waiting for their divorces.” Ann 
Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 381, 384 (2007). 
 48 Nevada permits prostitution in licensed brothels. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.354 (West 
2015). 
 49 As one commentator noted: 
[The lack of a central body governing the issuance of boxing licenses] gives state 
boxing commissions an incentive to promulgate and enforce lax regulations that 
bring boxing business into their states. In turn, boxers and promoters are encouraged 
to “forum shop” among the various state commissions in order to obtain licenses or 
to perpetuate unfair business practices with a minimum of oversight or interference. 
According to Senator John McCain . . . “[t]his vacuum of state regulation invite[s] 
forum shopping by unscrupulous promoters and managers and also provide[s] a fer-
tile breeding ground for fixed bouts, the exploitation of boxers, and a lack of ade-
quate medical services at many events. 
Brad Ehrlichman, In This Corner: An Analysis of Federal Boxing Legislation, 34 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 421, 437 (2011) (latter alternations in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 50 See U.C.C. § 2-105 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (defining goods as “all 
things . . . which are moveable at the time of identification to the contract for sale”). 
 51 Associated Press, Washington, Colorado Have Few Ways to Stop Carry-On Weed, N.Y. 
POST (Jan. 30, 2014), http://nypost.com/2014/01/30/washington-colorado-have-few-ways-to-stop-
carry-on-weed/ [http://perma.cc/WC5A-EFYL] (noting that “[i]t can be easier to get through air-
port security with a bag of weed than a bottle of water”). 
 52 In 2012, before Colorado legalized recreational marijuana use, the Post Office reported a 
substantial uptick in intercepted marijuana packages emanating from the state, likely a result of 
Colorado’s liberal medicinal marijuana statute. John Ingold, Colorado Post Offices See Increase 
in Marijuana Packages, DENVER POST (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_20058373 
[http://perma.cc/UH2K-6J6K]. 
 53 Jenny Deam, Colorado’s Neighbors Dismayed by New Wave of Marijuana Traffic, L.A. 
TIMES (May 27, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-pot-trafficking-20140527-story.html#
page=1 [http://perma.cc/R85V-Z2JY] (noting a sharp rise in marijuana trafficking in Nebraska 
counties bordering Colorado). 
 54 See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2006) (up-
holding imposition of liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) on a Canadian copper smelter that discharged “hazardous sub-
stances” into a Canadian stretch of the Columbia River that were “carried downstream in the pass-
ing river current and settled in slower flowing quiescent areas” in the United States). 
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laws of gravity and hydrology guide interstate watercourses, greed drives 
the movement of Colorado pot. Marijuana is the most lucrative cash crop in 
the United States.55 The resulting “high demand in the interstate market will 
draw” Colorado weed “into that market” thereby having a “substantial ef-
fect on the supply and demand” of the drug in the black markets of neigh-
boring states.56 Significant evidence demonstrates that large quantities of 
Colorado cannabis are now being diverted into these markets.57 The Court 
should employ the same principles it once applied in cases involving inter-
state environmental nuisances to resolve this problem. 
The burden faced by the Court in an action seeking relief for the spill-
over effects of Colorado marijuana is less onerous than that presented by 
the environmental-nuisance cases of the past. The Court is not comprised of 
scientists and is ill-equipped to resolve controversies such as what concen-
tration of a given pollutant in air or water is acceptable.58 As such, in the 
days before the EPA, it was forced to rely on “often vague and indetermi-
nate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence” to resolve such 
disputes.59 But it is well settled that “when Congress addresses a question 
previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law the need 
for such an unusual lawmaking by federal courts disappears.”60 Congress 
has not delegated adjudication of interstate-nuisance actions involving mari-
juana to an administrative agency as it did with air and water-quality dis-
putes.61 But it also has not left the question of whether the introduction of 
marijuana into interstate commerce constitutes a nuisance to the “vague and 
indeterminate . . . maxims of equity jurisprudence.”62 An activity constitutes 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Nitya Venkataraman, Marijuana Called Top U.S. Cash Crop, ABC NEWS (Dec. 18, 2006), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=2735017 [http://perma.cc/277A-GGPG] (noting that 
marijuana is the most profitable cash crop in the United States). 
 56 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 57 See infra notes 182–212 and accompanying text (noting a surge in seizures of Colorado 
cannabis in surrounding states). 
 58 The Court recently explained Congress’s decision to endow the EPA with primary respon-
sibility for regulating greenhouse gases: 
It is altogether fitting that Congress designated an expert agency, here, EPA, as best 
suited to serve as primary regulator of greenhouse gas emissions. The expert agency 
is surely better equipped to do the job than individual district judges issuing ad hoc, 
case-by-case injunctions. Federal judges lack the scientific, economic, and techno-
logical resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this order. 
Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539–40. 
 59 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317. 
 60 Id. at 314. 
 61 See infra notes 286–333 and accompanying text (distinguishing air and water quality dis-
putes from marijuana disputes because Congress has not delegated an agency to adjudicate mari-
juana disputes). 
 62 See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317. 
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a public nuisance when it creates “significant interference with the public 
health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public 
convenience.”63 Congress has determined that the “importation, manufac-
ture, distribution, and possession” of marijuana has “a substantial and det-
rimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American people”64 
and that the intrastate “distribution and possession of [marijuana] contrib-
ute[s] to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances.”65 
Although Congress has settled the question of whether the introduction 
of marijuana into commerce constitutes a public nuisance,66 it remains the 
Court’s duty to determine what remedy, if any, is available. In our view, 
issuance of injunctive relief of the sort sought by Nebraska and Oklahoma 
would violate the Constitution. Such an order would entail the judicial 
commandeering of Colorado’s legislature and law enforcement in violation 
of the Tenth Amendment.67 Instead, we argue that the Court should award 
damages to prevailing sister states, compensating them for the injuries in-
flicted by the incursion of Colorado marijuana into their territory. 
In making this contention, we draw inspiration from Nobel laureate 
Ronald Coase’s Theorem for Externalities.68 The Coase Theorem69 contends 
                                                                                                                           
 63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B; accord Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 
2536 (defining federal common law nuisance as activities “harmful to . . . citizens’ health and 
welfare”). 
 64 21 U.S.C. § 801(2) (2012) (stating Congress’s findings and declarations on controlled sub-
stances which include marijuana). These findings rest on solid science. As a recent study pub-
lished in the New England Journal of Medicine concluded, marijuana use causes “long-lasting 
changes in brain function that can jeopardize educational, professional and social achievements.” 
Nora D. Volkow et al., Adverse Health Effects of Marijuana Use, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2219, 
2225 (2014). 
 65 21 U.S.C. § 801(4). 
 66 The Justice Department announced that it will not seek indictments of Colorado vendors 
that sell marijuana pursuant to Colorado law. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department 
Announces Update to Marijuana Enforcement Policy (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/2013/August/13-opa-974.html [http://perma.cc/J3CV-R3R7]. This in no way affects the legality 
of Colorado pot vendors’ conduct. As stated by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Col-
orado, 
[F]ederal prosecutors may well choose to exercise their prosecutorial discretion and 
decline to seek indictments under the CSA where the activity that is illegal on the 
federal level is legal under Colorado state law. Be that as it may, even if [marijuana 
vendors are] never charged or prosecuted under the CSA, . . . [u]nless and until 
Congress changes that law, . . . [their] activities constitute a continuing federal 
crime. 
In re Rent-Rite Super Kegs West Ltd., 484 B.R. 799, 805 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012). 
 67 See infra notes 369–427 and accompanying text (asserting that the Constitution’s anti-
commandeering proscriptions deny the Court the power to compel Colorado to enact or enforce 
laws banning the possession or sale of marijuana). 
 68 In its original incarnation, the Coase Theorem was premised on two criteria. First, Coase 
asserted the law must clearly assign property rights—e.g., the right of neighbors to receive com-
pensation from polluters for externalities. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 
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that if transaction costs are eliminated, “parties will negotiate the efficient 
solution to . . . nuisance problem[s].”70 This is so because in the absence of 
such costs, an enterprise that can exploit its property rights more efficiently 
than its neighbors will be able to contract with them to buy their interests,71 
in effect, “shar[ing] . . . the profits associated with the nuisance . . . in ex-
change for allowing the nuisance to continue.”72 
Because transaction costs plague modern life,73 real-world application 
of the Coase Theorem is only attained through the application of legal rules 
that best approximate the way disputes would be resolved in the absence of 
such costs.74 
                                                                                                                           
J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, Social Cost]. Second, he contended that transaction 
costs need to be practically eliminated. See id. He postulated that in such an environment more 
profitable enterprises that are able to internalize the costs of their venture and earn profits suffi-
cient to justify the harms they produce will be able to “buy out” their afflicted neighbors by 
providing them a share of the profits in exchange for allowing the nuisance to continue. See id.; 
Stacey L. Dogan & Ernest A. Young, Judicial Takings and Collateral Attack on State Court Prop-
erty Decisions, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 114 n.31 (2011). Coase acknowledged 
that it is impossible to eliminate transaction costs. RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND 
THE LAW 174 (1988). In later life, he clarified his theory, asserting that the goal of the law should 
be to focus on the first of the two criteria addressed in his early work—the establishment of “an 
appropriate system of property rights”—one driven by predictable rules forcing polluters to inter-
nalize the cost of externalities resulting from their enterprises. Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional 
Structure of Production, in NOBEL LECTURES IN ECONOMIC SCIENCE 11, 17 (Torsten Persson ed., 
1997). Such rules enable the most economically efficient of competing landowners to prevail in 
property disputes. Id. 
 69 The Coase Theorem is regarded as “one of the most influential works on the law.” M. Al-
exander Pearl, Of “Texans” and “Custers”: Maximizing Welfare and Efficiency Through Informal 
Norms, 19 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 32, 33 (2014); accord Coltman v. Comm’r, 980 F.2d 
1134, 1137 (7th Cir. 1992) (celebrating Coase’s “long-belated but much-deserved Nobel Prize”); 
Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 
S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 669 (1979) (calling the Coase Theorem “the most significant legal-economic 
proposition to gain currency since the early utilitarians identified the maximization of individual 
satisfaction with consumer freedom from conscious state regulation”); Daniel S. Levy & David 
Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods? Reconsidering Property Rights and the Economic Allo-
cation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 493 (1994) (noting that the Coase Theorem 
is “[o]ne of the most influential ideas in the field of law and economics”). 
 70 Michael J. Meurer, Fair Division, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 937, 952 (1999). 
 71 See Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regu-
lation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 226 n.205 (1991). 
 72 Dogan & Young, supra note 68, at 114 n.31. 
 73 Coase identified at least two types of transaction costs: “the cost of discovering what the 
relevant [market] prices are,” and “the costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for 
each exchange transaction which takes place on a market.” COASE, supra note 68, at 38–39. 
 74 Steven N. Bulloch, Fraud Liability Under Agency Principles: A New Approach, 27 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 301, 307 n.29 (1986); Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation 
and Liability Rules—A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 69 (1968) [hereinafter Calabresi, Transac-
tion Costs]. 
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In the present case, such an outcome is best effectuated by a rule 
“charg[ing] the nuisance with the damages it cause[s].”75 If compelling a 
polluter to internalize the cost of the pollution drives the polluter out of 
business, then the enterprise was not the most economically efficient use of 
the property and the polluter’s interests should yield to that of its neigh-
bors.76 This is so because its prior success was premised upon the ability to 
force others to subsidize some of the costs of its business.77 The polluter 
was a free-rider.78 In contrast, if the polluter assumes responsibility for all 
the costs of its venture and still realizes a sufficient profit to stay in busi-
ness, then its use of the land is most efficient, and the polluter’s neighbors 
should yield to its interest.79 
If Colorado’s venture generates sufficient revenue to compensate its 
neighbors for transboundary harm and remains profitable its enterprise will 
have proven efficient and it will prevail by “shar[ing] . . . the profits associ-
ated with the nuisance” with its neighbors “in exchange for allowing the 
nuisance to continue.”80 Conversely, if internalizing the costs of extraterrito-
rial damage results in a net loss, its neighbors’ interests will ultimately pre-
vail. In either case, the viability of Colorado’s program will turn on whether 
the profits it generates exceed the harm it creates—exactly the metric that 
would govern in a transaction-cost-free environment. 
From a policy standpoint, we do not express an opinion whether mari-
juana legalization (or prohibition) is objectively “good” or “bad.” We re-
main agnostic.81 We simply posit that along with the wealth it generates, 
Colorado’s experiment produces harmful externalities that transcend the 
state’s borders. A judgment forcing Colorado to compensate its neighbors 
for these injuries is consistent with the premise that maximum utility can be 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 
499, 534–35 (1961) [hereinafter Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution]. 
 76 Id. (asserting that if a party causing a nuisance can compensate those harmed by the nui-
sance and still stay in business then the market has indicated that the benefits of the nuisance justi-
fy its existence) 
 77 J. Otto Grunow, Comment, Wisconsin Recognizes the Power of the Sun: Prah v. Maretti and 
the Solar Access Act, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1263, 1285 n.131 (noting that “when the externality is harm-
ful, the cost is simply passed on to others who, by absorbing the loss, subsidize that activity”). 
 78 Lisa Schenck, Climate Change Crisis—Struggling for Worldwide Collective Action, 19 
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 319, 335 (2008) (“Free-riding occurs when some parties bear 
the costs of an action, while others, the free-riders, bear no burden, but still enjoy the benefits.”). 
 79 See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution, supra note 75, at 534–35. 
 80 See Dogan & Young, supra note 68, at 114 n.31. 
 81 Although our arguments focus on the negative externalities associated with marijuana, we 
do not intend to vilify marijuana. Many legal goods and activities—like alcohol, firearms, and 
gambling—create negative externalities. Ordinarily each state, as a quasi-sovereign, can decide 
the legality of the vice in question. But when a majority of jurisdictions all ban a particular thing 
and dissenting states fail to contain it to their borders, the Constitution’s transboundary nuisance 
prohibition is implicated. 
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achieved by forcing “the damaging business to pay for all damage 
caused.”82 
This Article consists of three Parts. Part I explores the history and pur-
poses underlying the Supreme Court’s state-controversy jurisdiction—
particularly cases involving transboundary nuisances.83 We contend that 
sister-state suits seeking relief for extraterritorial harm caused by Colora-
do’s experiment—like interstate environmental nuisances of the past—fall 
squarely within the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court by the Constitu-
tion. In making this argument, we distinguish our thesis from Nebraska’s 
and Oklahoma’s pending federal-supremacy suit. Because their suit seeks to 
vindicate distinctively federal interests, we contend that they lack standing 
to assert it. 
Part II examines the federal common law of nuisance.84 Congress has 
partially preempted the question presented here. Its finding that the com-
mercial exploitation of marijuana has “a substantial and detrimental effect 
on the health and general welfare of the American people”85 establishes that 
Colorado’s regime is an interstate nuisance per se. 
Finally, Part III analyzes the remedies available to a state prevailing in 
such an action.86 We assert that the anti-commandeering doctrine precludes 
injunctive relief of the sort sought by Nebraska and Colorado. Instead, we 
contend that the Court should award a prevailing state damages compensat-
ing it—as well as can be done by a monetary award—for the harm inflicted 
by Colorado’s experiment. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT POSSESSES ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER 
NUISANCE SUITS SEEKING RELIEF FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL HARM  
CAUSED BY COLORADO’S MARIJUANA-LEGALIZATION EXPERIMENT 
A. State-Controversy Jurisdiction 
The Constitution endows the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction 
over suits between states “as a substitute for the diplomatic settlement of 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 68, at 2. 
 83 See infra notes 87–278 and accompanying text. 
 84 See infra notes 279–368 and accompanying text. 
 85 21 U.S.C. § 801(2). As it would be impracticable for a nine-member panel to make factual 
findings, when the Court accepts jurisdiction over an original action, it appoints a special master 
to conduct the proceedings. JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE DISPUTES: THE SUPREME 
COURT’S ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 215 (2006). “[T]he special master performs a role similar to the 
one performed by the U.S. District Court.” Id. The master ultimately submits proposed findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended decree, all of which are “subject to consideration, 
revision, or approval by the Court.” Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 551 (1963); accord 
Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special Masters in the Su-
preme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625, 654 (2002). 
 86 See infra notes 369–494 and accompanying text. 
1844 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1829 
controversies between sovereigns and a possible resort to force.”87 The first 
Congress made the Court’s jurisdiction over such matters “exclusive”88 and 
it remains so to this day89—“as in its very nature it necessarily must be.”90 
This jurisdiction is limited “to disputes which, between states entirely inde-
pendent, might be properly the subject of diplomatic adjustment.”91 “If the 
[C]onstitution ha[d] given to no department the power to settle” such quar-
rels, “the large and powerful states” would inevitably force the “weak ones” 
to “acquiesce and submit to [their] physical power.”92 
Recalling the “horrid picture of the dissensions and private wars” be-
tween states that plagued fifteenth-century Germany, Alexander Hamilton 
argued in The Federalist that it is “essential to the peace of the Union” to 
entrust “that tribunal . . . having no local attachments” to resolve the “bick-
erings and animosities” that will inevitably “spring up among the members 
of the Union.”93 Hamilton’s fears were prescient. In 1922, Supreme Court 
intervention “narrowly averted” an “armed conflict[]” between Texas and 
Oklahoma over a boundary dispute.94 Even as the Court heard the case, “the 
militia of Texas” were amassing “to support the orders of [the Texas] courts, 
and an effort was being made to have the militia of Oklahoma called for a 
like purpose.”95 
“[T]here is no definition or description, contained in the Constitution 
of the kind and nature of the controversies” encompassed by state-
controversy jurisdiction.96 Thus, in exercising such jurisdiction, the Court 
“look[s] not merely to” the Constitution’s “language,” but also to “its histor-
ical origin” and to prior opinions in which the “meaning and the scope” of 
original jurisdiction “have received deliberate consideration.”97 Although 
“it would be objectionable, and, indeed, impossible, for the [C]ourt to antic-
ipate by definition what controversies can and what cannot be brought with-
in [its] original jurisdiction,”98 historically, such cases generally fall into 
three categories: conflicts over boundary lines,99 water rights disputes,100 
                                                                                                                           
 87 North Dakota II, 263 U.S. at 372–73. 
 88 Kansas I, 185 U.S. at 139 (“The original jurisdiction of this court over ‘controversies be-
tween two or more [s]tates’ was declared by the judiciary act of 1789 to be exclusive . . . .”). 
 89 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
 90 Kansas I, 185 U.S. at 139. 
 91 North Dakota II, 263 U.S. at 372–73. 
 92 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 726 (1838). 
 93 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 94 Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 580 (1922). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 219. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 241. 
 99 E.g., New Jersey v. New York, 526 U.S. 589 (1999) (settling a dispute regarding jurisdic-
tion over Ellis Island); Nebraska v. Iowa, 145 U.S. 519 (1892) (concluding that a sudden shift in 
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and transboundary nuisances.101 This latter class of cases has proven the 
most vexing.102 
“When the states by their union made the forcible abatement of outside 
nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to what-
ever might be done.”103 Rather, the Constitution entrusts the Court to equi-
tably resolve such feuds.104 “The [s]tates, by entering the Union, did not 
sink to the position of private owners, subject to one system of private 
law.”105 
1. Examples of Original Nuisance Actions 
States have invoked the Court’s original jurisdiction on more than a 
dozen occasions to thwart a neighbor’s alleged nuisance.106 Although the 
                                                                                                                           
the Missouri River did not change the boundary between states); Missouri v. Kentucky, 78 U.S. 
395 (1870) (settling ownership of a Mississippi River island); Missouri v. Iowa, 48 U.S. 660 
(1849) (settling Missouri’s northern boundary with Iowa). 
 100 E.g., New Jersey I, 283 U.S. at 341–42 (alleging New York drew an inequitable amount of 
water from the Delaware River before it entered New Jersey); Wisconsin, 278 U.S. at 367 (chal-
lenging Illinois’s diversion of water from Lake Michigan to the Mississippi River which substan-
tially reduced water levels in the lower Great Lakes); Wyoming, 259 U.S. at 455 (alleging Colora-
do drew an inequitable amount of water from the Laramie River before it entered Wyoming). 
 101 E.g., Vermont, 417 U.S. at 270 (accusing New York of polluting Lake Champlain); New 
Jersey II, 283 U.S. at 476–77 (seeking to enjoin off-shore garbage dumping by New York City 
that caused trash to wash ashore on New Jersey beaches); New York, 249 U.S. at 202–03 (seeking 
to enjoin New Jersey’s discharge of sewage into New York Harbor); Tennessee Copper I, 206 
U.S. at 230 (alleging poisonous gas emanating from a Tennessee plant caused damage in Geor-
gia); Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 219 (alleging Illinois’s discharge of untreated sewage into the Missis-
sippi River polluted drinking water in Missouri); South Carolina, 93 U.S. at 9 (challenging Geor-
gia’s obstruction of navigation on the Savannah River); Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 
(13 How.) at 564–65 (alleging that a low-hanging Virginia bridge obstructed navigation on the 
Ohio River). 
 102 “There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds 
the word ‘nuisance.’ . . . There is general agreement that it is incapable of any exact or compre-
hensive definition.” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 86, at 616 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. 
 103 Tennessee Copper I, 206 U.S. at 237. 
 104 See Rhode Island, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 726 (“Bound hand and foot by the prohibitions of 
the [C]onstitution, a complaining state can neither [negotiate treaties], or fight with its adversary 
. . . .”). 
 105 Tennessee Copper I, 206 U.S. at 237–38. Original actions involving interstate nuisances 
are governed by federal common law. E.g., Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 103–04; Missouri I, 180 U.S. 
at 241–42; FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 41, at 287. But the Court, “[s]itting, as it were, as an 
international, as well as a domestic, tribunal, [looks to f]ederal law, state law, and international 
law, as the exigencies of the particular case may demand,” in promulgating the common-law rules 
that govern such disputes. Kansas I, 185 U.S. at 146–47. 
 106 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (identifying more than a dozen Supreme Court 
decisions standing in judgment of state experiments alleged to produce transboundary nuisances). 
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Court’s original nuisance decisions are too numerous to chronicle in detail 
here, a few notable examples merit discussion.107 
In 1851, Pennsylvania became the first state to successfully invoke the 
Court’s original jurisdiction to abate a sister state’s nuisance, obtaining an 
order compelling the removal of a Virginia bridge over the Ohio River that 
prevented high-stacked steamships from reaching Pittsburgh’s harbor.108 
The Court recognized that because the Ohio River is “a navigable stream” 
capable of carrying “commerce upon it . . . to other [s]tates,” Virginia’s au-
thorization of a bridge that “obstruct[s] navigation . . . could afford no justi-
fication [for its construction].”109 
Four years later, the Court reversed itself, allowing the bridge to be re-
built after Congress enacted statutes declaring it part of a federal post road, 
essential “for the passage of mails.”110 The Court—confronting the first in-
stance of congressional preemption of federal common law—concluded that 
its 1851 holding was no longer binding because “[i]t was in conflict with 
[subsequent] acts of [C]ongress, which [are] the paramount law.”111 
In the early 1900s, Illinois found itself in the crosshairs of two nui-
sance suits involving the Illinois Waterway, a man-made watercourse con-
necting Lake Michigan with the Mississippi River.112 In 1901, Missouri 
sued Illinois seeking to enjoin Chicago from releasing untreated sewage 
into the Mississippi through the waterway.113 The bill alleged that St. Louis 
had suffered a typhoid fever outbreak after Illinois began diverting waste to 
the Mississippi.114 The Court unanimously overruled Illinois’s demurrer, 
concluding that Missouri’s claims, if substantiated, “threatened” the “health 
and comfort” of all Missourians and thus constituted a nuisance under fed-
eral common law.115 Such cases fall squarely within the Constitution’s grant 
                                                                                                                           
 107 For a near-complete list of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction cases, see Cheren, 
supra note 34, at 200–25. 
 108 See Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 564–65. The site of the bridge, 
Wheeling, is in present-day West Virginia. Robert W. Milburn, Congress Attempts to Remove 
Federal Court Supervision Over State Prisons: Is 3626(b)(2) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
Constitutional?, 6 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 75, 83 n.62 (1997) (noting that although the 
Virginia borders encompassed Wheeling at the time of the decision, Wheeling is in present day 
West Virginia). The Court’s decision predated West Virginia’s formation. Id. 
 109 Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 564–65. 
 110 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 429 (1855). 
 111 Id. at 430. The supremacy of Congress’s judgment was supported by its power “To estab-
lish . . . post Roads.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
 112 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ROCK ISLAND DIST., HISTORIC AMERICAN ENGINEER-
ING RECORD: ILLINOIS WATERWAY, available at http://cdn.loc.gov/service/pnp/habshaer/il/il0900/
il0920/sheet/00001v.jpg [http://perma.cc/WCL9-SSBP] (presenting the history and specifications 
of the Illinois Waterway). 
 113 Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 248. 
 114 Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri II), 200 U.S. 496, 522–23 (1906). 
 115 Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 241. 
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of state-controversy jurisdiction. “If Missouri were an independent and sov-
ereign [s]tate . . . she could seek a remedy by negotiation, and, that failing, 
by force.”116 Since Missouri’s “diplomatic powers” were “surrendered to the 
general government,” the Constitution entrusted the Supreme Court “to 
provide a remedy.”117 
After the case was tried, the Court ultimately denied relief because Illi-
nois successfully invoked the unclean-hands doctrine—an affirmative defense 
dictating that a plaintiff will be denied equitable relief if it is proven that “he 
has engaged in the same conduct that he describes in his Complaint.”118 Illi-
nois proved that Missouri allowed its own towns to discharge the very same 
pollutants into the river, albeit in smaller quantities.119 Noting that the offend-
ing Missouri discharges were “above the intake of St. Louis,” the Court 
averred that “[w]here, as here, the plaintiff . . . deliberately permits discharges 
similar to those of which it complains,” it cannot claim that the defendant’s 
acts were wrongful and “courts should not be curious to apportion the 
blame.”120 
The Illinois Waterway became the subject of litigation once again in 
1929—this time through a challenge by the state’s northerly neighbors. In 
that case, Wisconsin and Minnesota, joined by Ohio and Pennsylvania, ob-
tained an injunction compelling Illinois to reduce the amount of water di-
verted from Lake Michigan to the Mississippi River after water levels 
dropped precipitously in the lower Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Riv-
er.121 
In 1931, New Jersey successfully invoked the Court’s powers, obtain-
ing an injunction putting an end to New York’s long-standing practice of 
                                                                                                                           
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Pujals ex rel. El Rey de los Habanos, Inc. v. Garcia, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 
2011). 
 119 Missouri II, 200 U.S. at 522. 
 120 Id.; see also Merrill, supra note 27, at 999 (noting that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Missouri v. Illinois in 1906 “alludes twice to the equitable doctrine of unclean hands”). 
 121 Wisconsin, 278 U.S. at 400. Ironically, the Illinois Waterway—now under the stewardship 
of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—became the subject of a federal common law of nuisance 
action again in 2011 in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 667 F.3d at 765. This time, Michigan sued the Waterway’s federal custodians, alleging 
that the invasive Asian carp would “migrate through waterworks operated by the defendants from 
rivers connected to the Mississippi into Lake Michigan and on to the other Great Lakes.” Id. at 
771. The court rejected the defendants’ contention that they could not be held to answer in a nui-
sance action because the carp “travel on their own.” Id. The court concluded that the defendants 
“bear responsibility for nuisance caused by their operation of a manmade waterway between the 
Great Lakes and Mississippi watersheds.” Id. The fact that “they are not themselves physically 
moving fishing from one body of water to the other does not mean that their normal operation” of 
the Waterway “cannot cause a nuisance.” Id. 
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dumping garbage offshore.122 The Court awarded relief because New Jersey 
proved that its beaches had become inundated with New York trash.123 
Original actions such as these once comprised a relatively common 
part of the Court’s docket, “run[ning] like threads of gold”124 through some 
4100 pages of the U.S. Reports.125 The number of these actions fell dramat-
ically in the 1970s following Congress’s expansion of the Clean Air and 
Water Acts. These statutes set uniform national air and water-quality stand-
ards and “provide a forum for the pursuit of such claims before [an] expert 
agenc[y],” the EPA,126 rendering the Court’s historic role of establishing and 
enforcing interstate environmental standards obsolete.127 Because most 
transboundary nuisance actions stemmed from such disputes, contemporary 
lawyers and jurists have no experience with these once-common suits.128 
2. The Supreme Court’s Transboundary Nuisance Jurisprudence Is 
Consistent with Customary International Law 
In formulating principles to adjudicate transboundary nuisance cases, 
the Supreme Court serves a role analogous to the International Court of Jus-
tice. “Sitting, as it were, as an international, as well as a domestic, tribunal, 
[the Court looks to f]ederal law, state law, and international law, as the exi-
gencies of the particular case may demand,” in promulgating the rules that 
govern such disputes.129 The most famous international transboundary nui-
sance suit ever litigated is the Trail Smelter case, a dispute between the 
United States and Canada adjudicated between 1938 and 1941.130 The case 
                                                                                                                           
 122 New Jersey II, 283 U.S. at 478–83. 
 123 Id. 
 124 JAMES BROWN SCOTT, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES OF 
THE AMERICAN UNION, at vii (1919). 
 125 Cheren, supra note 34, at 107 (noting original jurisdiction decisions comprise 4100 pages 
of the U.S. Reports). 
 126 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 326; accord Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539. These 
opinions do not suggest that Congress has similarly preempted the Court’s jurisdiction over an 
original nuisance action challenging Colorado’s marijuana regime. Although Congress has classi-
fied marijuana as a nuisance, it has not assigned cross-border nuisance disputes involving the drug 
to an “expert agenc[y].” Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 326; see infra notes 286–333 and accompany-
ing text (distinguishing marijuana disputes from air and water pollution disputes because Congress 
has not delegated marijuana disputes to an expert agency). 
 127 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2536; Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314. 
 128 See Percival, supra note 46, at 717 (asserting that “the federal common law of interstate 
nuisance” met “its ultimate demise following the enactment of the Clean Water Act”). 
 129 Kansas I, 185 U.S. at 146–47. 
 130 See Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1962; BRATSPIES & MILLER, supra note 27, at 3 (observ-
ing that Trail Smelter has assumed “almost mythological status”); Merrill, supra note 27, at 947 
(calling Trail Smelter “[b]y far the most influential decision on transboundary pollution in interna-
tional law” and noting that it “has assumed immense importance in the development of the cus-
tomary international law on transboundary pollution”); Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Déjà Vu: 
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involved a Canadian copper-smelting plant in Trail, British Columbia, about 
ten miles north of the U.S. border.131 Like the smelters condemned by Ten-
nessee Copper, the plant emitted noxious gases that caused property dam-
age in neighboring Washington.132 The respective governments agreed to 
submit the controversy to a specially appointed panel of arbitrators.133 To-
day, the panel’s work is regarded as “a landmark decision” in transboundary 
nuisance law134 and enjoys “almost mythological status” in the field.135 
Noting that no international tribunal had ever tackled such a dispute, 
the panel turned to the Supreme Court’s state-controversy opinions, con-
cluding that “the law followed in the United States in dealing with the qua-
si-sovereign rights of the [s]tates of the Union . . . is in conformity with the 
general rules of international law.”136 Applying Tennessee Copper and Mis-
souri v. Illinois, the panel concluded that,  
[U]under the principles of international law as well as of the law 
of the United States, no [s]tate has the right to use or permit the 
use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury . . . to the 
territory of another or the properties or persons therein . . . .137  
The panel concluded that both customary international law and the U.S. 
Constitution dictate that a “[s]tate owes at all times a duty to protect other 
[s]tates against injurious acts by individuals from within its jurisdiction.”138 
And when a state fails to fulfill this obligation, it must “pay compensation 
for the transboundary harm it has caused.”139 Concluding that the Canadian 
smelter had caused significant cross-border damage, the panel awarded 
damages to the United States.140 
                                                                                                                           
Extraterritoriality, International Environmental Law, and the Search for Solutions to Canadian-
U.S. Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363, 364–65 (2005) (calling Trail 
Smelter “a landmark decision in international environmental law” and “the most famous interna-
tional environmental law dispute”); Michael J. Robinson-Dorn, The Trail Smelter: Is What’s Past 
Prologue? EPA Blazes a New Trail for CERCLA, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 233, 236 (2006) (noting 
that the Trail Smelter arbitration is “one of the foundations of international law”). 
 131 Robinson-Dorn, supra note 130, at 243 (providing factual background about the Trail 
Smelter arbitration). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 249. 
 134 Parrish, supra note 130, at 364. 
 135 BRATSPIES & MILLER, supra note 27, at 3. 
 136 Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1963; see Merrill, supra note 27, at 938 (“[T]here is a fairly 
high degree of consensus under . . . international customary law . . . [that] a source state is legally 
responsible for transboundary pollution emanating from sources within its jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 137 Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1964–65 (citing Missouri II, 200 U.S at 521, and Tennessee 
Copper I, 206 U.S. at 230). 
 138 Id. at 1963. 
 139 BRATSPIES & MILLER, supra note 27, at 3. 
 140 Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1907, 1965. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court continues to adhere to the Trail Smelter prin-
ciples.141 In 1983, the Court concluded that Idaho had stated a prima facie 
cause of action against Oregon and Washington for failing to prevent pri-
vate fishermen within their respective jurisdictions from “tak[ing] a dispro-
portionate share of [Columbia and Snake River] fish destined for Idaho.”142 
Under the Constitution, the Court said, “[s]tates have an affirmative duty . . . 
to take reasonable steps to conserve . . . the natural resources within their 
borders for the benefit of other [s]tates.”143 
3. Colorado’s Introduction of Marijuana into Interstate Commerce Satisfies 
the Requirements for an Original Nuisance Action 
Like downstream pollution produced by industrial operations, the 
transboundary externalities resulting from Colorado’s introduction of mari-
juana into the stream of interstate commerce fall squarely within the ambit 
of the Court’s original jurisdiction. The exercise of this jurisdiction is most 
appropriately applied “to questions in which the sovereign and political 
powers of the respective states [are] in controversy”144—and in particular, 
those involving a quarrel for which a “sovereign [s]tate . . . could seek a 
remedy by negotiation, and, that failing, by force.”145 The present contro-
versy presents just such a case. It strikes at the heart of the competing “sov-
ereign and political powers of the respective states.”146 And as independent 
nations, Colorado’s sister states would possess the full panoply of diplomat-
ic measures to limit the flow of marijuana into their territory. 
Most importantly, neighboring states could step up customs enforce-
ment by closely inspecting individuals, motor vehicles and vessels entering 
their domain. It is well settled that sovereign nations possess the unfettered 
authority “to protect [themselves] by stopping and examining persons and 
property crossing into [their] country.”147 Thus, searches conducted by fed-
                                                                                                                           
 141 See, e.g., Evans, 462 U.S. at 1024–25 (recognizing that Oregon and Washington are obli-
gated to regulate private fishermen so as to prevent them from taking an inequitable share because 
“[s]tates have an affirmative duty . . . to take reasonable steps to conserve . . . the natural resources 
within their borders for the benefit of other [s]tates” (emphasis added)); Vermont, 417 U.S. at 
270–71 (finding New York had a constitutional obligation to prevent a privately owned paper mill 
from polluting an interstate waterway); Tennessee Copper I, 206 U.S. at 238–39 (finding Tennes-
see had a constitutional obligation to prevent a private copper-smelting business from polluting 
the air of a neighboring state); Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 564–65 
(finding Virginia had a constitutional obligation to prevent a company operating a private toll 
bridge over the Ohio River from obstructing navigation). 
 142 Idaho, 444 U.S. at 385. 
 143 Evans, 462 U.S. at 1025 (emphasis added). 
 144 Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 226. 
 145 Id. at 241. 
 146 Id. at 226. 
 147 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977). 
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eral customs officials at the U.S. border are “not subject to the warrant pro-
visions of the Fourth Amendment and [are] ‘reasonable’ within the meaning 
of that Amendment.”148 
But upon joining the Union, Colorado’s neighbors gave up these pow-
ers. The Constitution divests states of the power to conduct customs search-
es.149 Such inspections both violate the Fourth Amendment and run afoul of 
the states’ obligation to accord visitors “the privileges and immunities of 
[their] own residents.”150 As such, states “ha[ve] no sovereign authority to 
prohibit entry into [their] territory” and “border and customs control” for all 
“ports of entry” must be exclusively “conducted by federal officers.”151 
Absent exigent circumstances, baggage cannot be searched without a 
warrant.152 And the Supreme Court has recognized that vehicle searches 
conducted by state law-enforcement officers violate the Fourth Amendment 
“unless supported by . . . probable cause.”153 Thus, so long as they abstain 
from conduct providing police probable cause to search their vehicles,154 
nothing prevents citizens of states where marijuana is illegal from driving to 
Colorado, filling their trunks with lawfully purchased pot and returning to 
their home states with their illicit bounty.155 
Airports likewise are ill-equipped to detect marijuana inside luggage. 
U.S. airports lack the capability to meaningfully screen passengers for can-
                                                                                                                           
 148 Id. at 617. 
 149 Torres, 442 U.S. at 472–73; see supra note 40 and accompanying text (noting that the 
Constitution prohibits states from conducting customs inspections of containers, vehicles, and 
persons entering their territory). 
 150 Torres, 442 U.S. at 473; see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
 151 Torres, 442 U.S. at 473. Because individuals smuggling marijuana out of Alaska by car 
would have to pass through customs in order divert it to another state, we believe that Alaska (or 
Hawaii if it chose to follow suit) is largely immune from the arguments we present in this Article. 
 152 Id. at 471. The Court has held that baggage within automobiles is subject to the “automo-
bile exception” and can be searched without a warrant if supported by probable cause. Wyoming 
v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 301 (1999). 
 153 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 668 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 154 But see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814–16 (1996) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment does not prevent police from pretextually stopping motorists who commit minor 
infractions). 
 155 Colorado law permits marijuana vendors to sell their wares to Coloradans one ounce at a 
time, but limits sales to out-of-state residents to one quarter ounce at a time. COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 12-43.4-402(3)(a) (2014). Although this provision limits the amount of cannabis non-
Coloradans can buy at any one store, the statute does nothing to prevent visitors (or Colorado 
residents) from “smurfing”—going from store to store to accumulate large amounts of pot to sell 
into the out-of-state black market. Editorial, Maryland Should Slow Down on Pot Legalization, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/maryland-should-slow-
down-on-pot-legalization/2014/01/12/bf218e5c-798a-11e3-af7f-13bf0e9965f6_story.html [http:// 
perma.cc/XGM8-XPKD]. In addition, one commentator has argued that by distinguishing between 
Coloradans and residents of other states, Colorado may have violated the dormant Commerce 
Clause. Brannon P. Denning, One Toke Over the (State) Line: Constitutional Limits on “Pot Tour-
ism” Restrictions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2279, 2291 (2014). 
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nabis.156 As the Associated Press reported, “[i]t can be easier to get through 
airport security with a bag of weed than a bottle of water.”157 
Once outside Colorado, this marijuana is easily diverted into the black 
markets of neighboring states. As Justice Scalia observed, rejecting argu-
ments that the federal-marijuana ban unconstitutionally intrudes upon state 
sovereignty,158 when a state permits marijuana to be introduced into its in-
trastate market, that marijuana “is never more than an instant from the inter-
state market—and this is so whether or not the possession is . . . lawful . . . 
under the laws of a particular [s]tate.”159 
Admittedly, Colorado’s diversion of marijuana into interstate com-
merce differs from conventional pollution because it involves criminal acts 
carried out by third parties—purchasers who take marijuana across state 
lines. Colorado argues that this renders the Court’s transboundary nuisance 
precedents inapplicable. After all, it asserts, “[w]hen a person purchases 
marijuana in Colorado and transports it across state lines, that person is vio-
lating . . . federal law and the laws of [other s]tates.”160 One scholar echoed 
these sentiments, asserting that subjecting Colorado to nuisance liability 
rests on the “astounding argument” that states owe their neighbors an “af-
firmative obligation” to prevent their citizens from causing transboundary 
harm.161 But the Supreme Court’s interstate-nuisance decisions recognize 
just such an obligation. They hold that the Constitution imposes “an affirm-
ative duty” on every state to protect its neighbors from harm emanating 
from its territory.162 This includes “a duty to protect other [s]tates against 
injurious acts by individuals from within its jurisdiction.”163 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See Associated Press, supra note 51. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Raich, 545 U.S. at 41 (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that federal preemption of state 
laws permitting marijuana use present no “violation of state sovereignty of the sort that would 
render this regulation ‘inappropriate’” (citation omitted)). 
 159 Id. at 40. This is a function of economics. As one commentator noted, “drug prices reflect 
risk premiums charged at each stage of the manufacturing and distribution process: drug traffick-
ers demand greater compensation to offset the risks of apprehension and incarceration.” Michael 
M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 868 (2004). But when a state 
decriminalizes a drug the risk premium disappears and prices fall. Id. This will “become quite 
attractive to users in nearby get-tough states” because the drug may “be easily purchased in [the 
drug decriminalization] state and carried back home across our open interstate borders.” Id. Thus, 
opening a commercial drug market in one state will “make drugs cheaper and more readily availa-
ble to the residents of other states, thus undermining the ability of get-tough states to achieve their 
preferences to be drug-free.” Id. 
 160 Colorado’s Brief in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 19, Nebraska, 
135 S. Ct. 2070 (No. 144 ORG) [hereinafter Opposition Brief]. 
 161 Jonathan H. Adler, Are Nebraska and Oklahoma Just Fair-Weather Federalists?, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/
12/19/are-nebraska-and-oklahoma-just-fair-weather-federalists/ [http://perma.cc/8L2H-M9TW]. 
 162 Evans, 462 U.S. at 1025 (emphasis added); accord Vermont, 417 U.S. at 270–71 (holding 
New York had a constitutional obligation to prevent a privately owned paper mill from polluting 
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This principle is consistent with the common law of public nuisance. It 
is well settled that “[t]he law reasonably imposes a duty on a possessor of 
land to ensure that activities on that land—where the possessor has con-
trol—do not produce a nuisance.”164 Consequently, a defendant is liable for 
criminal acts committed by third parties that emanate from his or her territo-
ry if the defendant “had reasonable anticipation of harm and failed to exer-
cise reasonable care to avert such harm.”165 One “cannot knowingly allow 
his [or her] property to become a haven for criminals to the detriment of . . . 
neighbors and deny that [the] property has become a nuisance because the 
resulting criminal activities are those of third parties.”166 As explained in 
greater detail below, Colorado both is on notice that its marijuana market is 
harming sister states and has failed to exercise reasonable care to avert that 
                                                                                                                           
an interstate waterway); Tennessee Copper I, 206 U.S. at 238–39 (holding Tennessee had a consti-
tutional obligation to prevent a private copper-smelting business from polluting the air of a neigh-
boring state); Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 564–65 (holding Virginia 
had a constitutional obligation to prevent a company operating a private toll bridge over the Ohio 
River from obstructing navigation). 
 163 Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1963 (quoting CLYDE EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF 
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (1928)) (emphasis added); accord Vermont, 417 U.S. at 270–
71 (holding New York had a constitutional obligation to prevent a privately owned paper mill 
from polluting an interstate waterway); Tennessee Copper I, 206 U.S. at 238–39 (holding Tennes-
see had constitutional obligation to prevent a private copper-smelting business from polluting the 
air of a neighboring state); Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 564–65 (hold-
ing Virginia had a constitutional obligation to prevent a company operating a private toll bridge 
over the Ohio River from obstructing navigation). 
 164 Redevelopment Agency of Stockton v. BNSF Ry., 643 F.3d 668, 676 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 165 Kelly v. Boys’ Club of St. Louis, Inc., 588 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); accord 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 838. 
 166 Kelly, 588 S.W.2d at 257; accord Redevelopment Agency, 643 F.3d at 676 (noting that 
“[t]he law reasonably imposes a duty on a possessor of land to ensure that activities on that land—
where the possessor has control—do not produce a nuisance”); Lew v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 42, 45 (Ct. App. 1993) (considering irrelevant whether a nuisance was caused by the 
actions of third parties when considering whether a property constitutes a nuisance); Statler v. 
Catalano, 521 N.E. 2d 565, 573 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that a defendant was liable for the 
actions of another when the defendant knew of the activity and failed to exercise reasonable care 
to prevent it); Eaton v. Cormier, 748 A.2d 1006, 1008 (Me. 2000) (noting that a landowner is 
liable for a nuisance created by the activity of a third party if the landowner knows of the risk that 
the activity will cause a nuisance yet still consents or fails to take reasonable care to prevent that 
activity); Sholberg v. Truman, 852 N.W.2d 89, 93–94 (Mich. 2014) (asserting that “control and 
possession are the determinative factors in the imposition of liability [for nuisance]”); State v. 
Charpentier, 489 A.2d 594, 598 (N.H. 1985) (holding that a property owner was liable for the 
dumping of waste onto her property by a third party because she had knowledge of the dumping 
and consented to it); Mark v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 84 P.3d 155, 161 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2004) (explaining that owners of land may be liable for the acts of third parties that cause a 
nuisance if the owners know of the risk of nuisance and consent to or fail to prevent the activity); 
City of Seattle v. McCoy, 4 P.3d 159, 169 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (adopting the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts standard of liability for a possessor who fails to take reasonable care to prevent nui-
sance by the activity of another); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 383. 
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harm.167 Addressing Colorado’s toothless warnings to marijuana purchasers 
that it is unlawful to take pot out of the state, the Los Angeles Times bluntly 
noted (no pun intended): “[I]t’s fantasy to think that won’t happen.”168 
A 2011 opinion from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, Michigan v. U.S. Army Corp of Engineers—fittingly directed at the 
Illinois Waterway, the man-made watercourse connecting the Great Lakes 
with the Mississippi River that was the target of two prominent original ac-
tions in the early twentieth century169—illustrates this principle. There, the 
court rejected arguments by the Army Corps of Engineers, the watercourse’s 
modern-day custodian,170 that the Corps is immune from liability for the 
threatened migration of an invasive species of carp into the Great Lakes 
through the waterway.171 The Corps asserted it cannot be held to answer in a 
federal common law of nuisance action because the carp “travel on their 
own.”172 The court concluded that the Corps “bear[s] responsibility for nui-
sance caused by [its] operation of a manmade waterway between the Great 
Lakes and Mississippi watersheds.”173 The fact that the Corps is “not . . . 
physically moving fish from one body of water to the other does not mean 
that [its] normal operation” of the waterway “cannot cause a nuisance.”174 
Likewise, the fact that Colorado is not “physically moving” marijuana over 
its borders “does not mean that” its “normal operation” of its commercial 
pot market—which employs no meaningful safeguards to prevent spillover 
into other jurisdictions—“cannot cause a nuisance” in neighboring states.175 
Scholars Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper, and Sam 
Kamin recently co-authored an article arguing that Colorado and other ma-
rijuana-friendly states should be permitted to continue their experiments so 
long as their “regulatory regimes effectively prevent [certain] harms”176—
namely “the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state 
law . . . to other states” and “drugged driving and the exacerbation of other 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See infra notes 182–212 and accompanying text (examining the diversion of Colorado 
marijuana to surrounding states and the corresponding failure of Colorado to take actions to pre-
vent this diversion). 
 168 Deam, supra note 53. 
 169 See supra notes 112–121 and accompanying text (detailing two nuisance suits involving 
the Illinois Waterway, a manmade watercourse connecting Lake Michigan and the Mississippi 
River). 
 170 See Jenco v. United States, No. 89 C 8897, 1991 WL 204964, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 1991) 
(noting that the Army Corps of Engineers now exercises jurisdiction over the Illinois Waterway). 
 171 Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d at 771. The plaintiffs could not invoke the Court’s origi-
nal jurisdiction because the defendant was a federal agency, not a state. See id. at 773. 
 172 Id. at 771. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Chemerinsky et al., supra note 4, at 78. 
2015] State-Controversy Jurisdiction and Marijuana Legalization 1855 
adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use.”177 Pro-
fessor William Baude likewise argues that “[i]f a state legalizes and regu-
lates a drug in a way that minimizes the risk of spillovers into the interstate 
black market, the federal drug laws should be forbidden to apply within that 
state.”178 
We agree.179 States may quarrel over the propriety of legalized gam-
bling,180 but so long as Nevada’s casinos remain in its territory, its neighbors 
have no say in the matter. But Colorado has manifestly failed to prevent 
marijuana purchased in its wide-open pot marketplace from spilling into the 
black markets of neighboring states. And neither Dean Chemerinsky and his 
colleagues nor Professor Baude offer any concrete suggestions as to how 
Colorado could prevent such spillover.181 
In the first months of Colorado’s experiment, authorities in surround-
ing states reported a surge in seizures of Colorado marijuana.182 States along 
                                                                                                                           
 177 Id. at 121. 
 178 William Baude, State Regulation and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 65 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 513, 514 (2015). 
 179 See DeVeaux, supra note 22, at 1058 (arguing that the dormant Commerce Clause divests 
states of the authority to regulate their citizens’ extraterritorial conduct). 
 180 See, e.g., A. Gregory Gibbs, Anchorage: Gaming Capital of the Pacific Rim, 17 ALASKA 
L. REV. 343, 374 (2000) (“Providing a legal gambling environment may exacerbate the problem 
of compulsive gambling, and is a cost to consider in the expansion of legalized gambling. As with 
most aspects of gambling behavior and its effects, there is a lack of good research into how threat-
ening the compulsive gambling problem is . . . .”). 
 181 But see W. David Ball, Bring Back the Opium Den, USA TODAY (Feb. 11, 2015), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/02/11/marijuana-legislation-recreation-legalized-drug-alcoho
l-column/23254653/ [http://perma.cc/HP4H-9RA4] (lamenting that marijuana regulations “do not 
allow on-premises consumption in commercial establishments such as bars and restaurants” because 
“[t]he best way to limit diversion from the legal market . . . would be to shift all marijuana use, or at 
least as much as possible, to on-premises consumption”). 
 182 Associated Press, supra note 51; Deam, supra note 53 (reporting on the widespread appre-
hension in surrounding states about increased marijuana traffic coming from Colorado); Matt Ferner, 
Keep Your Legal Weed in Colorado, Say Cops in Neighboring States, HUFFINGTON POST (May 28, 
2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/28/colorado-marijuana_n_5405422.html [http://per
ma.cc/E9AU-6HBP] (reporting that “law enforcement officials in Nebraska counties that share a 
border with Colorado are frustrated over what they say has been a sharp rise in marijuana trafficking 
busts from the Centennial state”); David Hendee, Nebraska on Its Own with Drug Enforcement Costs 
Tied to Colorado Pot Sales, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Apr. 20, 2014), http://m.omaha.com/news/
nebraska-on-its-own-with-drug-enforcement-costs-tied-to/article_d76f74a4-b109-5080-9d7b-4e
26264686bc.html?mode=jqm [http://perma.cc/FH7C-5ZP9] (noting that those “on Nebraska’s mari-
juana frontier are biting the bullet over the costs of enforcing drug violations attributed to Colorado’s 
legalized pot”); Trevor Hughes, In Tiny Nebraska Towns, a Flood of Colorado Marijuana, USA TO-
DAY (June 12, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/06/11/colorado-marijuana-
exports/9964707/ [http://perma.cc/7XKX-L8UC] (asserting that Nebraska police officers along the 
Colorado border have seen a “massive influx of marijuana flowing into and through their communi-
ties”); John Ingold & Eric Gorski, More Colorado Pot Is Flowing to Neighboring States, Officials 
Say, DENVER POST (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_24008061/more-
colorado-pot-is-flowing-neighboring-states [http://perma.cc/YPR3-Y5MH] (reporting that that de-
spite the difficulty of obtaining precise statistics “Colorado pot is clearly moving into neighboring 
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the Interstate 80 corridor have been the hardest hit,183 but agents have seized 
Colorado cannabis as far away as Florida and New York.184 
Colorado voters legalized medicinal marijuana in 2000, permitting 
qualified individuals who obtained a “recommendation”185 from a Colorado 
physician to receive a card authorizing them to grow and possess up to two 
ounces of the drug.186 The law did not authorize the commercial sale of ma-
rijuana, medicinal or otherwise, and between 2001 and 2008 the number of 
individuals authorized to cultivate homegrown marijuana slowly grew to 
about 4800.187 Beginning in 2009, Colorado began licensing commercial 
dispensaries to sell marijuana to qualified cardholders.188 By November 
2012, the State had licensed 532 dispensaries and the number of cardholders 
swelled to over 108,000.189 
Although Colorado’s pot program remained confined to medicinal 
purposes in name, it became an open secret that marijuana cards could be 
                                                                                                                           
states”); Amanda Kost & Jennifer Kovaleski, Colorado Weed Blamed for Increasing Law Enforce-
ment Costs in Nebraska, DENVER CHANNEL (May 25, 2014), http://www.thedenverchannel.
com/news/local-news/colorado-blamed-for-increasing-law-enforcement-costs-in-nebraska [http://
perma.cc/XZ4P-T3KJ] (finding that Colorado’s legalization of recreational marijuana may have 
increased the costs of drug enforcement in Nebraska); Ben Neary, Wyoming Governor Braces for 
Influx of Colorado Pot, MISSOULA MISSOULIAN (Sept. 14, 2013), http://missoulian.com/news/state-
and-regional/wyoming-governor-braces-for-influx-of-colorado-pot/article_abd7b5b2-1c9f-11e3-
ba78-001a4bcf887a.html [http://perma.cc/ZS5P-MLSB] (noting the concern held by Wyoming Gov-
ernor Matt Mead about increased trafficking in his state following Colorado’s legalization of recrea-
tional marijuana). 
 183 Hendee, supra note 182. 
 184 Ingold & Gorski, supra note 182. 
 185 Seeking to avoid federal criminal liability for its physicians, Colorado law provides that 
the state’s doctors do not “prescribe” medicinal marijuana. Burns v. State, 246 P.3d 283, 286 
(Wyo. 2011) (noting that “Colorado law simply allows for a physician to certify that a patient 
might benefit from the use of marijuana as a medical treatment” (citing COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, 
§ 14(c))). Colorado then left it “entirely up to the patient whether to apply for a medical marijuana 
registry card from the State of Colorado” and assigned the State itself (rather than a physician) to 
make “the final determination whether the patient qualifies for the registry card, thereby exempt-
ing the patient from criminal liability for possessing amounts of marijuana necessary for medicinal 
purposes.” Id. (citing COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(c)). “The recommendation language was 
carefully chosen; Supreme Court precedent in the abortion context had established the proposition 
that doctors could not be banned from discussing or recommending particular health care options. 
Thus a doctor who might lose [his or] her [Drug Enforcement Agency] license for prescribing a 
drug could ‘recommend’ it with impunity.” Chemerinsky et al., supra note 4, at 85 (footnotes 
omitted). 
 186 1 ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREAS, THE LEGALIZATION 
OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO: THE IMPACT 2 (2013), http://nrfocus.org/wp-content/uploads/
2013/08/Legalization-of-MJ-in-Colorado-The-Impact.pdf [http://perma.cc/F5CY-Y9C3] [herein-
after LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO, VOL. 1]. 
 187 Id. at 5. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
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easily procured by anyone willing to feign the most innocuous ailment.190 A 
2013 audit revealed that just twelve doctors had authorized half of the cards 
issued by the state.191 As the Denver Post candidly acknowledged in a 2013 
editorial: “We don’t doubt some of those people fit the criteria for medical 
marijuana, but we also suspect many were just aching for marijuana.”192 
Thus, beginning in 2009, Colorado effectively legalized recreational 
pot for Coloradoans willing to take the time to obtain a local doctor’s rec-
ommendation.193 Since that time, the Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Area (“HIDTA”), a federal agency within the National Office of 
Drug Control Policy,194 has conducted three studies measuring the externali-
ties—both inside Colorado and in surrounding states—arising from Colora-
do’s lax marijuana laws.195 
                                                                                                                           
 190 See Lynn Bartels, Denver Lawmaker Wants Medical-Pot Rules Clarified, DENVER POST 
(Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.denverpost.com/rawnews/ci_13613617 [http://perma.cc/2Q65-YBS7] 
(reporting on Colorado Senator Chris Romer’s frustration with how Colorado’s medical marijuana 
laws have been exploited); Editorial, Denver and Colorado Are Lost in a Fog on Pot Regulation, 
DENVER POST (July 21, 2013) http://www.denverpost.com/ci_23688653/denver-and-colorado-are-
lost-fog-pot-regulation [http://perma.cc/2F6E-E9X9] [hereinafter Editorial, DENVER POST] (re-
porting on the regulatory failures of Colorado’s legalization experiment); Leonardo Haberkorn, 
Uruguay Leader Calls Colorado Pot Law a ‘Fiction,’ DENVER POST (May 2, 2014), 
http://www.denverpost.com/marijuana/ci_25684993/uruguays-president-calls-colorado-pot-law-fi
ction [http://perma.cc/88EJ-HMXN] (highlighting President of Uruguay Jose Mujica’s comments 
that Uruguay’s legal marijuana market will be more regulated and less based on “fiction” and 
“hypocrisy” than Colorado’s market); Rebecca Tonn, Attorney General, Drug Task Force Shut 
Down Marijuana Ring in Colorado, COLO. SPRINGS BUS. J. (Jan. 7, 2011), http://csbj.com/
2011/01/07/attorney-general-drug-task-force-shut-down-marijuana-ring/ [http://perma.cc/9G4C-
LMMR] (providing an example of a growing trend in Colorado of parties growing marijuana un-
der the guise of legalization and then illegally distributing it). 
 191 Editorial, DENVER POST, supra note 190. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Colorado’s full-scale legalization of recreational pot is surely proving much worse for its 
neighbors. Although one did not have to suffer any real ailment to acquire cannabis under the state’s 
“medicinal” marijuana program, the law required consumers to obtain a recommendation from a 
Colorado physician and a state-issued card before they could purchase legal weed. LEGALIZATION OF 
MARIJUANA IN COLORADO, VOL. 1, supra note 186, at 4–5. These requirements made it difficult for 
out-of-state residents—and particularly tourists—to partake in Colorado’s marijuana market. See 
Jack Healy, In Line Early for Milestone on Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/02/us/colorado-stores-throw-open-their-doors-to-pot-buyers.html? 
_r=0 [http://perma.cc/4VHJ-9WB6] (describing how the state’s new recreational-use laws eliminated 
these impediments). 
 194 See High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program, OFF. NAT’L DRUG CON-
TROL POL’Y, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/high-intensity-drug-trafficking-areas-program 
[http://perma.cc/H6SS-WQZM] (explaining the HIDTA Program). 
 195 LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO, VOL. 1, supra note 186, at 1; 2 ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, THE LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN 
COLORADO: THE IMPACT 1 (2014), http://www.rmhidta.org/html/2014%20FINAL%20Legalization
%20of%20MJ%20in%20Colorado%20the%20Impact%202.0.pdf [http://perma.cc/K32Y-JYHL] 
[hereinafter LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO, VOL. 2]; 3 ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIGH 
INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, THE LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO: THE 
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From 2010 to 2014—a period when traffic fatalities dropped nearly 
8% overall—the studies reveal that fatal car accidents involving drivers 
who tested positive for marijuana increased 92%.196 In 2014, 20% of fatal 
car accidents involved a driver that was high on marijuana at the time of the 
crash.197 In 2009, drugged drivers were responsible for just 10% of all fatal 
accidents.198 In 2014 alone, marijuana-related traffic deaths increased 32% 
from the previous year.199 
These studies also reveal that Colorado has become a principal gate-
way through which marijuana enters the black markets of other states. In 
2014, highway-patrol confiscations of Colorado pot bound for other states 
increased 592% from the 2008 total.200 In fact, confiscations increased 34% 
in 2014 over the previous year.201 Investigators determined that the seized 
pot was bound for the black markets of at least thirty-six different states.202 
And from 2010 to 2014 the Postal Service reported a 2033% increase in 
intercepted parcels containing Colorado marijuana destined for other 
states.203 These interdictions undoubtedly constitute a small fraction of the 
Colorado marijuana funneled into neighboring states during the course of 
the studies.204 
Predictably, since Colorado embraced its wide-open marijuana market 
the state has witnessed an explosion in pot-based tourism.205 HIDTA’s stud-
ies strongly suggest that these out-of-state consumers are substantially con-
                                                                                                                           
IMPACT 1 (2015), http://www.rmhidta.org/html/2015%20FINAL%20LEGALIZATION%20OF%
20MARIJUANA%20IN%20COLORADO%20THE%20IMPACT.pdf [http://perma.cc/62T5-S4S7] 
[hereinafter LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO, VOL. 3]. 
 196 LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO, VOL. 3, supra note 195, at 1. 
 197 Id. at 2. 
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 199 Id. at 1. 
 200 Id. at 102. 
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 202 Id. 
 203 Id. at 123. 
 204 See LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO, VOL. 2, supra note 195, at 108 (noting 
that authorities in neighboring states are “just scratching the tip of the iceberg compared to what 
[is] out there”). 
 205 Trevor Hughes, Marijuana Tourists Sparking Up in Colorado’s Ski Towns, USA TODAY 
(July 10, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/07/10/colorados-marijuana-
market-is-far-larger-than-predicted/12438069/ [http://perma.cc/3VKZ-UCXA]; John Ingold & Jason 
Blevins, Marijuana Tourism Booms in Colorado, Though Officials Remain Skeptical, DENVER POST 
(Apr. 20, 2014), http://www.denverpost.com/marijuana/ci_25601236/marijuana-tourism-booms-
colorado-though-officials-remain-skeptical [http://perma.cc/RU6P-CZG5]; Aaron Smith, Tourists 
Flock to Colorado to Smoke Legal Weed, CNN MONEY (Aug. 22, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/
2014/08/22/smallbusiness/marijuana-tourism-colorado/index.html?hpt=hp_t2 [http://perma.cc/LPR5-
E9Q9]. 
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tributing to both highway deaths and black-market trafficking in neighbor-
ing states.206 
The officials charged with defending Colorado’s regime openly 
acknowledge the extraterritorial costs of the state’s venture. John Suthers, 
the state’s Attorney General from 2005 to 2015, asserted that it is “clear 
that . . . Colorado is becoming a significant exporter of marijuana to the rest 
of the country.”207 Cynthia Coffman, Suthers’s successor, agreed with his 
assessment, admitting that “[i]llegal drug dealers are simply hiding in plain 
sight, attempting to use [Colorado’s] legalized market as cover.”208 
The Task Force that Colorado created to implement its new marijuana 
laws openly acknowledged that “[a]dditional actions” are necessary “to lim-
it diversion out of Colorado.”209 Yet, short of instructing purchasers that it is 
unlawful to transport Colorado weed outside the state, it has done nothing 
to prevent diversion of marijuana into interstate black markets.210 
Voters and legislators in Colorado—and other states—will ultimately 
be called upon to judge whether the benefits of marijuana legalization justi-
fy its costs.211 The attendant injuries Colorado inflicts on its neighbors 
should be a part of its cost of doing business. Only then can other states de-
cide whether Colorado’s experiment is worth emulating.212 
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inafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
 210 See id. 
 211 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Unbundling Federalism: Colorado’s Legalization of Marijuana 
and Federalism’s Many Forms, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1067, 1082 (2014) (“Across the country, indi-
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4. Nebraska and Oklahoma Lack Standing to Assert Their Federal-
Supremacy Claim 
Instead of following the well-worn path laid by the Supreme Court’s 
transboundary nuisance precedents, Nebraska and Oklahoma chose to predi-
cate their suit on a novel theory. They argue that the CSA preempts Colora-
do’s marijuana decriminalization laws and thus the state’s pot-friendly stance 
violates the Supremacy Clause.213 Although Colorado’s initiative might be at 
                                                                                                                           
would be most called for—an explosion in consumption—enforcement costs would be 
greatest and the probability of a failed re-prohibition highest. As Humpty-Dumpty 
demonstrated, not all processes are reversible. While irreversibility is not itself an argu-
ment for the status quo, it is an argument for caution. 
Mark A.R. Kleiman & Aaron J. Saiger, Drug Legalization: The Importance of Asking the Right 
Question, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 527, 544 (1990). 
 213 Some scholars contend that Nebraska and Oklahoma should voluntarily dismiss their ac-
tion against Colorado and sue the Obama Administration “to force the [A]ttorney [G]eneral to 
enforce [the CSA] which undoubtedly is supreme over Colorado law.” Jess Bravin, Supreme 
Court Seeks Obama Administration Comment on Marijuana Case, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-seeks-obama-administration-comment-on-marijuana-
case-1430750718 [http://perma.cc/NL68-FYRG] (quoting University of Texas Professor Sanford 
Levinson); accord Randy Barnett, Another Misbegotten Reliance on Gonzales v. Raich, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/
12/31/another-misbegotten-reliance-on-gonzales-v-raich/ [http://perma.cc/86VQ-4LHK] (arguing 
that because Congress cannot make Colorado pass a law criminalizing marijuana “[t]he only con-
stitutional remedy for this interstate effect is a federal law like the CSA that will be enforced by 
the federal government”); Michael C. Dorf, Nebraska and Oklahoma Take Colorado to the Su-
preme Court over Legalized Marijuana, VERDICT (Dec. 31, 2014), https://verdict.justia.com/
2014/12/31/nebraska-oklahoma-take-colorado-supreme-court-legalized-marijuana [https://perma.
cc/SF4D-4QCV] (outlining various reasons why Nebraska’s and Oklahoma’s lawsuit “rests on a 
conceptual error”). In our view, this argument ignores the principles governing the exercise of 
executive power in uncertain cases. As the Supreme Court reaffirmed last June, “[i]n considering 
claims of presidential power this Court refers to Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite framework 
from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,” decided in 1952. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 
2076, 2083 (2015); accord Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661, 674, 690–91 (1981) 
(unanimously holding that Justice Jackson’s methodology governs such cases); see Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Youngstown 
addressed President Truman’s unilateral seizure of the American steel industry when a labor dis-
pute threatened production during the height of the Korean War. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582–83 
(majority opinion). The Court struck down the President’s action. Id. at 589. Justice Jackson as-
serted that “presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or 
conjunction with those of Congress.” Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). He offered a three-zone 
template to evaluate the scope of executive power. Id. at 635–38. In the first zone, “the President 
acts pursuant to an express or implied” congressional authorization. Id. at 635. Endowed with such 
legislative approval, the President’s power “is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses 
in his own right, plus all that Congress can delegate.” Id. In the second zone, “the President acts in 
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority.” Id. at 637. Zone three involves 
situations where “the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress.” Id. Here, “his power is at its lowest ebb, for he can rely only upon his own constitu-
tional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.” Id. Thus, if a presi-
dential act falls within the Justice Jackson’s third zone, it may only be sustained if it constitutes an 
exercise of “preclusive” Article II power. See id. at 638. For example, congressional nullification 
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odds with the CSA,214 Nebraska and Oklahoma lack standing to assert their 
federal-supremacy claim for two reasons. First, they lack the sort of “concrete 
and particularized” injury required to bring such a claim.215 Second, the Su-
premacy Clause “does not create a cause of action”; thus, absent express stat-
utory authorization, the Clause “leave[s] the enforcement of federal law to 
federal actors.”216 It is well settled that “there is no private right of action un-
der the Controlled Substances Act.”217 
                                                                                                                           
of presidential pardons would be invalid because authority to issue pardons is a preclusive Article 
II power. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3; United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 141–
42 (1871). Justice Jackson concluded that the steel seizure fell within the third zone because prior 
statutes tacitly prohibited the president’s action. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 639–40 (Jackson, J., 
concurring). “Congress has not left seizure of private property an open field, but has covered it by 
statutory policies inconsistent with the seizure.” Id. at 639. While deliberating the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947, Congress considered a draft of the bill giving the president the power 
to seize private enterprises in emergency situations, but declined to enact such legislation. Id. at 
601–02. From this, Justice Jackson inferred implicit congressional negation of such power. Id. at 
639–40. Because the power to seize private property does not fall within any field of preclusive 
executive authority, the Court invalidated the president’s order. Id. at 589 (majority opinion). In 
the present controversy, the Obama Administration has refused to enforce the CSA’s marijuana 
prohibitions against those complying with Colorado’s mandates. See Memorandum from James 
M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to U.S. Attorneys (June 29, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-
marijuana-use.pdf [http://perma.cc/R5KN-4PXE] (providing guidance on the Department of Jus-
tice’s position on enforcement of the CSA). President Obama’s refusal to enforce the federal mari-
juana ban is “incompatible with the expressed . . . will of Congress.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 
(Jackson, J., concurring). Thus, his decision not to enforce the CSA in Colorado, like President 
Truman’s steel seizure, falls within the third zone of Justice Jackson’s taxonomy. But, in our view, 
assertions that the courts can force the President’s hand ignore a crucial distinction between Presi-
dent Obama’s action (or inaction) and the steel seizure. “As Justice Jackson wrote in Youngstown, 
when a [p]residential power is ‘exclusive,’ it ‘disabl[es] the Congress from acting upon the sub-
ject.’” Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2095 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637–38 (Jackson, J., con-
curring) (second alternation in original) (emphasis added)). It is long settled that “the Executive 
Branch”—not Congress or the courts—“has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide 
whether to prosecute a case.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (emphasis added); 
accord Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 (1869). Because prosecutorial discretion is 
an exclusive presidential power, see Nixon, 418 U.S. at 693, the Constitution “disab[les] the Con-
gress” from interfering with the President’s exercise of this power. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-
38 (Jackson, J., concurring); accord Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2095. As such, the courts are without 
power to issue relief, notwithstanding the CSA’s provisions. See id. 
 214 See Zachary Bolitho, The Case Against Colorado’s Pot Law, L.A. TIMES (June 25, 2015), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0625-bolitho-colorado-preempt-20150624-story.html 
[http://perma.cc/KMX9-NKEX ] (“[I]f a state law interferes with congressional policies and ob-
jectives, it cannot stand. That’s precisely what we have with Colorado’s marijuana law and the 
CSA. . . . If states are free to disregard federal laws they don’t like, then our entire governmental 
structure is at risk.”). 
 215 See infra notes 218–243 and accompanying text (asserting that Nebraska and Oklahoma lack 
“concrete and particularized” injuries of the type required to pursue their federal-supremacy suit). 
 216 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc. 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383–34 (2015). 
 217 Felmlee v. Oklahoma, No. 13-CV-0803-CVE-TLW, 2014 WL 4597724, at *6 (N.D. Okla. 
Sept. 15, 2014) (denying the plaintiff’s claim under the controlled substance act because “there is 
no private right of action under the Controlled Substance Act”); accord Durr v. Strickland, 602 
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a. Nebraska and Oklahoma Lack “Concrete and Particularized” Injuries of 
the Type Required to Pursue Their Federal-Supremacy Suit 
To satisfy Article III’s standing requirement, a party must establish 
more than “a keen interest in the issue” being litigated.218 The litigant must 
establish an “injury in fact” by proving that he or she “has suffered a con-
crete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged con-
duct, and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”219 Ne-
braska’s and Oklahoma’s complaint asserts that they “have dealt with a sig-
nificant influx of Colorado-sourced marijuana,”220 forcing them to endure 
“increased costs for the apprehension, incarceration, and prosecution of 
suspected and convicted felons.”221 Such expenses constitute concrete and 
particularized transboundary nuisance injuries.222 But Nebraska and Okla-
                                                                                                                           
F.3d 788, 789 (6th Cir. 2010) (reasoning that the use of sodium thiopental as a means of execution 
cannot form the basis of a declaratory relief under the CSA because no private right of action 
exists under the CSA); Brown v. Endo Pharms., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1320 n.5 (S.D. Ala. 
2014) (noting that the CSA does not create a duty of care owed by a pharmaceutical manufacturer 
to an end user because the CSA does not create a private remedy); United States v. Real Property 
& Improvements Located at 1840 Embarcadero, Oakland, Calif., 932 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1072 
(N.D. Cal. 2013) (rejecting a claim under the CSA to enjoin criminal use of a property because 
“there is no private right of action under the CSA to force compliance”); Link v. Luebbers, 830 
F. Supp. 2d 729, 734 (E.D. Mo. 2011) (recognizing that the CSA does not create a private cause of 
action); Ringo v. Lombardi, 706 F. Supp. 2d 952, 956 (W.D. Mo. 2010) (noting that the plaintiff 
concedes the CSA provides no private right of action for enforcement but nevertheless seeks a 
declaration that defendant’s actions would violate the CSA); Jones v. Hobbs, 745 F. Supp. 2d 886, 
893–94 (E.D. Ark. 2010) (reasoning that “to entertain . . . a cause of action brought by private 
parties seeking a declaration that the . . . CSA has been violated would, in effect, evade the intent 
of Congress not to create private rights of action under those statutes”); McCallister v. Purdue 
Pharma L.P., 164 F. Supp. 2d 783, 793 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (reviewing the CSA and finding that it 
“establishes no [c]ongressional intent to create a private, civil right of action nor to permit remov-
al”). 
 218 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013). 
 219 Id. at 2661, 2663. 
 220 Complaint, supra note 9, at 25. 
 221 Id. at 26. 
 222 Nebraska and Oklahoma have not pled their injuries with the level of particularity required 
to invoke the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. “[T]he solicitude for liberal amendment of 
pleadings animating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . does not suit cases within [the Su-
preme] Court’s original jurisdiction.” Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1, 8 (1993). Although not 
as rigorous as the standard imposed in fraud causes of action, the Court requires claims be pled 
with a greater level of detail than is ordinarily required for notice pleading: “A State asking leave 
to sue another . . . must allege, in the complaint offered for filing, facts that are clearly sufficient to 
call for a decree in its favor.” Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291 (1934). Further, to obtain 
relief, a State must prove its case by more than a simple preponderance of evidence. “[T]he threat-
ened invasion of rights must be of serious magnitude and it must be established by clear and con-
vincing evidence” before relief may be granted. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 
(1921). Thus, to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction, a plaintiff-State’s complaint must allege facts 
with sufficient particularity to demonstrate that it could carry its burden of proving its enhanced 
burden of proof. To satisfy this burden in a marijuana nuisance action, we believe the Complaint 
must include statistical evidence demonstrating with some precision the harm Colorado pot is 
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homa ignore a critical aspect of the standing doctrine. To demonstrate the 
requisite injury-in-fact, it is insufficient to simply allege harm at the hands 
of a defendant. To possess standing the plaintiff must allege the “type of 
injury” the cause of action pled is designed to redress.223 
The injuries alleged by Nebraska and Oklahoma constitute precisely 
the kind of harm the federal common law of nuisance is meant to remedy. 
“The essential function” of such a suit is “to provide a civil means to re-
dress ‘a miscellaneous and diversified group of minor criminal offenses, 
based on some interference with the interests of the community, or the com-
fort or convenience of the general public.’”224 But Nebraska’s and Oklaho-
ma’s suit is not a nuisance cause of action. Instead, they seek to “enforce 
. . . the Supremacy Clause, Article VI of the U.S. Constitution.”225 This 
claim is unavailing. 
Unlike the transboundary nuisance doctrine, the Supremacy Clause 
vindicates the federal government’s interests, protecting it “from the divi-
sion of [its] power” by state actors.226 Absent express congressional intent 
                                                                                                                           
inflicting. This could include things like statistical data on highway accidents, the amount of mari-
juana interdicted that originated in Colorado, arrest rates, and increases in law-enforcement spend-
ing. The Nebraska-Oklahoma pleadings, in our view, do not meet this burden. They allege their 
shared injury only in very general terms: 
The significant increase in the trafficking of marijuana has led to the diversion of a 
substantial amount of personnel time, budget, and resources of the Plaintiff States’ 
law enforcement, judicial system, and penal system to counteract such trafficking. 
Plaintiff States have and will continue to incur considerable costs associated with 
the increased level of incarceration of suspected and convicted felons on charges re-
lated to Colorado-sourced marijuana including housing, food, health care, transpor-
tation to and from court, counseling, clothing, and maintenance. 
Opening Brief, supra note 9, at 8–9. To satisfy the heightened standards required to invoke origi-
nal jurisdiction, the complaint should be amended to include figures demonstrating the degree and 
magnitude of the harm inflicted by Colorado’s venture. Conclusory assertions that the venture is 
causing “considerable” harm do not allege facts demonstrating the plaintiffs can prove their claims 
by clear and convincing evidence. See id. A New York Times columnist characterized the com-
plaint’s allegations as “imprecise weasel words.” Lawrence Downes, A Great Plains Border War, 
over Cannabis, N.Y. TIMES: TAKING NOTE (Dec. 19, 2014), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/
2014/12/19/a-great-plains-border-war-over-cannabis/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/2B8M-BACJ]. We 
agree. Nebraska and Oklahoma have failed to plead the predicate facts necessary to invoke the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. Thus, their suit must be dismissed. See Jessica J. Berch, 
Waving Goodbye to Non-Waivability: The Case for Permitting Waiver of Statutory Subject-Matter 
Jurisdiction Defects, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 635, 639 (2014) (noting that the lack of “subject-
matter jurisdiction stands alone as the single unwaivable defect” in federal litigation). 
 223 Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 349–50 (1990) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis added). 
 224 Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF 
TORTS 583 (4th ed. 1971)). 
 225 Complaint, supra note 9, at 1. 
 226 Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 118 (1989). 
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to the contrary, the Clause “leave[s] the enforcement of federal law to fed-
eral actors.”227 
Nebraska and Oklahoma assert that Colorado’s decriminalization of 
marijuana “undermines federal priorities in the area of drug control and en-
forcement” and “interferes with U.S. foreign relations and broader narcotic 
and psychotropic-drug-trafficking interdiction and security objectives,” 
thereby harming “a wide range of U.S. interests.”228 These acts may harm 
the federal government. “No one doubts that a [sovereign] has a cognizable 
interest” in the enforcement of its own laws.229 But these alleged affronts to 
the federal government do not harm Nebraska and Oklahoma in a “concrete 
and particularized” way.230 
To have standing, a litigant “must allege a distinct and palpable injury 
to himself”231—he “must seek relief for an injury that affects him in a ‘per-
sonal and individual way.’”232 Where, as in the present case, a suit concerns 
the enforceability of a law, those who “have no role . . . in the enforcement” 
of that law “have no ‘personal stake’ in defending its enforcement that is 
distinguishable from the general interest of every citizen” of the polity that 
enacted it.233 “No matter how deeply committed” a litigant “may be to up-
holding” a particular law, “that is not a ‘particularized’ interest sufficient to 
create a case or controversy under Article III.”234 
In order to have the requisite “role . . . in the enforcement” of a law, a 
litigant must be a “designate[d] agent[]”235 of the jurisdiction that enacted 
it.236 This requirement ensures the political accountability of those litigating 
government interests. “If the relationship between two persons is one of 
agency . . . the agent owes a fiduciary obligation to the principal.”237 Con-
versely, nonagents “owe nothing of the sort to the people” of the sovereign, 
leaving them “free to pursue purely ideological commitment[s] . . . without 
the need to take cognizance of resource constraints, changes in public opin-
                                                                                                                           
 227 Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1383–84. 
 228 Complaint, supra note 9, at 21. 
 229 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2664. 
 230 See id. at 2661. 
 231 Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 126 (1991) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 
(1975)). 
 232 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560 n.1 (1992)). 
 233 Id. at 2663. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. at 2663–64. 
 236 Id. at 2666. 
 237 Id. at 2667. 
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ion, or potential ramifications for [the sovereign’s] other . . . priorities.”238 
While Nebraska and Oklahoma indisputably have a role in the enforcement 
of their own drug laws, they are not “designat[ed] agents” of the federal 
government.239 Thus, they lack the requisite “role . . . in the enforcement” of 
the CSA.240 
Implicitly recognizing this deficiency, Nebraska and Oklahoma assert 
that they have been forced to defend the federal government “[b]ecause the 
current federal administration seems unwilling” to do so.241 This argument 
too is unavailing. It is “a fundamental restriction on” the authority of federal 
courts that “in the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his or her own 
rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or 
interests of third parties.”242 And the Supreme Court has explicitly held that 
when a sovereign’s interests are at stake in litigation, nonagents of that sov-
ereign are not empowered to represent those interests merely because “the 
public officials charged with that duty refuse to do so.”243 As such, Nebras-
ka’s and Oklahoma’s federal-supremacy suit should be dismissed for lack of 
standing. 
b. A Cause of Action Cannot Be Predicated on a Mere Violation of the 
Supremacy Clause 
Nebraska’s and Oklahoma’s claim does not rest on a statutory or com-
mon law cause of action—it is predicated on the Supremacy Clause itself.244 
But as the Supreme Court recently explained the Clause “is not the source 
                                                                                                                           
 238 Id. The Attorneys General of Nebraska and Oklahoma are state elected officials. Because 
they do not stand for federal election, they are not accountable to the sovereign that is allegedly 
harmed by Colorado’s violation of the CSA. 
 239 See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2664. 
 240 See id. at 2663. 
 241 Opening Brief, supra note 9, at 10. 
 242 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2663 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). 
 243 Id. at 2660, 2666–67. In Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 
497, 520 (2007), the Court concluded that Massachusetts was “entitled to special solicitude in 
[the] standing analysis.” Id. But this remark provides no support to the Nebraska-Oklahoma claim 
for two reasons. First, that case was not predicated on the Supremacy Clause, but sought judicial 
review of an environmental-nuisance action that was initially properly brought to the EPA, the 
forum that “Congress provides for the pursuit of such claims.” Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 326; 
accord Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–19 (“Just as Georgia’s independent interest ‘in all the 
earth and air within its domain’ supported federal jurisdiction a century ago, so too does Massa-
chusetts’ well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory [from harm caused by air pollu-
tion] today.” (quoting Tennessee Copper I, 206 U.S. at 237)). Second, unlike the CSA, Congress 
explicitly authorized such actions in the Clean Air Act. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516 (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012)). The Court explicitly noted that Massachusetts was entitled to “spe-
cial solicitude” because of Congress’s express authorization of such suits and because of the 
Commonwealth’s “stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests.” Id. at 520. 
 244 Complaint, supra note 9, at 1. 
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of any federal rights” and it “certainly does not create a cause of action.”245 
Rather, it “merely creates a rule of decision.”246 It “establishes a constitu-
tional choice-of-law rule, mak[ing] federal law paramount.”247 If the Su-
premacy Clause made “it impossible to leave the enforcement of federal 
law to federal actors” the federal government’s “ability to guide the imple-
mentation of federal law” would be “significantly curtail[ed].”248 
Seeking to avoid the import of this holding, Nebraska and Oklahoma 
assert that “federal courts may in some circumstances grant injunctive relief 
against state officers who are violating, or planning to violate, federal 
law.”249 But this caveat only applies when the plaintiff has pled an inde-
pendent cause of action that is recognized by common law or authorized by 
statute. Once such a cause of action “properly comes before a court, judges 
are bound [to apply] federal law” over any conflicting state law.250 In a 
transboundary nuisance action the federal common law of nuisance would 
thus supersede any contradictory state law.251 But Nebraska and Oklahoma 
have eschewed such a claim. 
The only conceivable basis for their suit independent of the Supremacy 
Clause is the violation of the CSA itself. But this too is a nonstarter. “[I]f 
Congress does not intend for a statute to supply a cause of action for its en-
forcement, it makes no sense to claim that the Supremacy Clause itself must 
provide one.”252 It is well settled that “there is no private right of action un-
der the Controlled Substances Act.”253 As such, Nebraska’s and Oklahoma’s 
cause of action is not viable. 
                                                                                                                           
 245 Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1383. 
 246 Id. 
 247 Viva! Int’l Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., 162 P.3d 
569, 571 (Cal. 2007); accord Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1383. 
 248 Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1383–84. 
 249 Reply Brief, supra note 9, at 7 (quoting Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1384). 
 250 Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1384. 
 251 Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 488 (1987) (explaining that under the Suprema-
cy Clause, federal common law of nuisance supersedes contradictory state law). 
 252 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1212 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). The majority’s opinion “d[id] not address” whether the Supremacy Clause conferred 
standing to nonfederal litigants. Id. at 1211. A majority of the Court later adopted the Chief Jus-
tice’s view. See Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1383–84. 
 253 Felmlee, 2014 WL 4597724, at *6; accord Durr, 602 F.3d at 789; Brown, 38 F. Supp. 3d 
at 1320 n.5; 1840 Embarcadero, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 1070; Link, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 734; Ringo, 
706 F. Supp. 2d at 956; Jones, 745 F. Supp. 2d at 893–94; McCallister, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 783. 
Three of these cases were brought by death-row inmates asserting that the lethal-injection drugs 
their states utilized were banned by the CSA. See Durr, 602 F.3d at 789; Felmlee, 2014 WL 
4597724, at *6; Jones, 745 F. Supp. 2d at 893–94. If the harm they faced—a prolonged and ago-
nizing death—was insufficient to confer standing, it defies logic to believe that Nebraska and 
Oklahoma could clear this hurdle. 
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B. Marijuana Differs Fundamentally from Other Goods Whose  
Legality Vary from State to State 
Some commentators assert that a judgment against Colorado will “set 
a very dangerous precedent”—inviting retaliatory suits between neighbor-
ing states.254 One scholar predicts “it won’t be long before New York and 
other northeastern states are in federal court arguing that Oklahoma, Ne-
braska, and other states have an affirmative obligation to control greenhouse 
gas emissions.”255 We disagree. 
As noted above, interstate air and water disputes once comprised a rel-
atively large part of the Court’s docket. But Congress has since preempted 
the Court’s jurisdiction over such disputes by “provid[ing] a forum for the 
pursuit of such claims before [an] expert agenc[y],” the EPA.256 Indeed, 
such disputes remain relatively common today.257 But the Supreme Court 
has explicitly held that they cannot be the basis of original actions before 
the Supreme Court.258 
Another scholar similarly asserts that if a neighboring state can prevail 
in an original action against Colorado, then “states that have less restrictive 
labor regulations” statutes will be targets for suits.259 Again, we disagree. 
Even if divergent state labor laws could create a transboundary nuisance—
                                                                                                                           
 254 Ilya Somin, Dangerous Implications of the Nebraska-Oklahoma Lawsuit Against Marijua-
na Legalization in Colorado, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/12/19/dangerous-implications-of-the-nebraska-oklahoma-
lawsuit-against-marijuana-legalization-in-colorado/ [http://perma.cc/2Z7L-PYZ9]; accord Barnett, 
supra note 213. 
 255 Adler, supra note 161. 
 256 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 326; see Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539. These opin-
ions do not suggest that Congress has similarly preempted the Court’s jurisdiction over an original 
nuisance action challenging Colorado’s marijuana regime. Although Congress has classified mari-
juana as a nuisance, it has not assigned cross-border nuisance disputes involving the drug to an 
“expert agenc[y].” Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 326; see infra notes 286–333 and accompanying text 
(distinguishing air and water pollution disputes from marijuana disputes because marijuana dis-
putes have not been delegated to an expert agency for adjudication). 
 257 See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2532 (addressing the question of whether several 
states, the city of New York, and three private land trusts can successfully claim public nuisance 
against four private power companies and the federal Tennessee Valley Authority for emitting harm-
ful amounts of carbon dioxide); Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–19 (recognizing the right of the EPA 
to protect Massachusetts by prescribing vehicle emission standards); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 
U.S. 91, 98–99 (1992) (accepting the role of the EPA to “veto a source [s]tate’s issuance of any per-
mit if the waters of another [s]tate may be affected”); Int’l Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 490–91 (asserting 
that “[a]n affected [s]tate’s only recourse is to apply to the EPA [A]dministrator, who then has the 
discretion to disapprove the [source state’s] permit if he [or she] concludes that the discharges will 
have an undue impact on interstate waters”). 
 258 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2536 (finding the Clean Air Act preempts federal 
common law of nuisance with regard to interstate air pollution); Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314 
(finding amendments to the Clean Water Act preempt federal common law of nuisance with re-
gard to pollution of interstate bodies of water). 
 259 Somin, supra note 254. 
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and it is unclear how they could—Congress likewise has assigned such dis-
putes to an expert agency. “Congress has created by statute a uniform body 
of laws governing” labor disputes substantially affecting interstate com-
merce “and has vested in the National Labor Relations Board the exclusive 
jurisdiction over administration of those laws.”260 
Although the parade of horribles suggested by these scholars may be 
dismissed, a legitimate concern lies at their core. Many commercial goods 
may be legally possessed in one state but are outlawed in others: for example, 
moonshine,261 fireworks,262 radar detectors,263 and unpasteurized milk.264 We 
recognize that our thesis begs the question of whether awarding Colorado’s 
neighbors relief for pot-related damages will open a Pandora’s box, inviting 
original actions challenging the intrastate sale of these other products. 
While we do not undertake a complete examination of the laws gov-
erning such chattels, it is doubtful that a state may be successfully sued for 
creating a nuisance by allowing the introduction of any of these articles into 
interstate commerce. The jurisprudence governing such actions includes 
two important limiting principles that likely thwart any such suits. 
First, as the Court explained in Missouri v. Illinois, plaintiff-States are 
subject to the unclean-hands doctrine.265 A State cannot obtain equitable 
relief if it engages—even to a lesser degree—in the challenged conduct.266 
When a plaintiff “deliberately permits” conduct “similar to [that] of which it 
complains,” it cannot claim that the defendant’s acts are wrongful and 
                                                                                                                           
 260 Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 394 n.10 (1986). 
 261 State v. Altman, 106 So. 2d 401, 403 n.1 (Fla. 1958) (noting that the legality of different 
types of moonshine varies from state to state). 
 262 See Giotis v. Apollo of the Ozarks, Inc., 800 F.2d 660, 668 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding Wis-
consin possessed personal jurisdiction over a Minnesota fireworks distributor based on its sale of 
products that were legal in Minnesota but illegal in Wisconsin because it profited from sending 
fireworks to a neighboring state where it knew that fireworks were illegal). 
 263 William A. Drennan, The Patent Office Is Promoting Shocking New Tax Loopholes—
Should the Empire Strike Back?, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 491, 510–11 (2007) (noting that radar detec-
tors are legal in some states and illegal in others). 
 264 Damian C. Adams et al., Déjá Moo: Is the Return to Public Sale of Raw Milk Udder Non-
sense?, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 305, 306 (2008) (noting although the Food and Drug Administra-
tion requires that all milk that enters interstate commerce be pasteurized, the agency permits states 
to regulate intrastate milk sales; thus, some states require milk to be pasteurized, whereas others 
permit the sale of raw milk). 
 265 See Missouri II, 200 U.S. at 522. The Court denied Missouri relief despite its proving that 
Illinois had allowed Chicago to discharge substantial amounts of untreated sewage into the Mis-
sissippi River because Missouri had allowed its own towns upstream from St. Louis to engage in 
the same conduct. Id. The Court was unmoved by the apparent fact that the towns along the river 
above St. Louis were necessarily much smaller than Chicago and their sewage discharges were not 
of the magnitude of than those challenged. Id.; see also Merrill, supra note 27, at 999 (noting that 
Missouri v. Illinois “alludes twice to the equitable doctrine of unclean hands”). 
 266 Missouri II, 200 U.S. at 522. 
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“courts should not be curious to apportion the blame.”267 Thus, in order to 
prevail in an equitable suit involving the sale of a chattel, the State bringing 
the action would likely have to ban the good almost entirely.268 
Second, the law of nuisance does not reward the prudish. To qualify as 
a nuisance, the offending behavior cannot be of a type that would be offen-
sive only to a person of “fastidious taste.”269 Whether something constitutes 
a nuisance “is measured by ordinary sensibilities, tastes, and habits.”270 
Thus, before a state’s decision to permit the sale of a good can be con-
demned as a nuisance, a general consensus must exist among the majority 
of states that the article constitutes a nuisance. 
The Twenty-First Amendment gives Kansas the power to outlaw beer 
if it chose to do so.271 But if it enacted such a law, it would be an outlier. 
Since Prohibition’s end, the ordinary sensibilities of every state have ac-
cepted alcohol as permissible.272 Although the Constitution entitles it to 
adopt such a policy, a state taking such an extreme position cannot use the 
federal common law of nuisance to force its “fastidious tastes” on its neigh-
                                                                                                                           
 267 Id. 
 268 Almost any original action targeting a state because of lenient gun laws would founder on 
this principle. We do note that if a state radically departed from conventional norms governing 
firearms regulation—i.e., by openly facilitating the sale of guns to out-of-state felons—it might 
have legitimate concerns over such a suit (assuming that such an action could withstand Second 
Amendment scrutiny). We reserve consideration of the implications of our theory to state gun 
laws for a future article. 
 269 Fowler v. Fayco, Inc., 275 So. 2d 665, 669 (Ala. 1973) (“The inconvenience complained 
of must not be fanciful, or such as would affect only one of a fastidious taste, but it should be such 
as would affect an ordinary reasonable man.” (quoting ALA. CODE § 6-5-120 (1975))); accord 
Shatto v. McNulty, 509 N.E.2d 897, 899 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that whether an act is a 
nuisance “is measured by ordinary sensibilities, tastes, and habits in light of the circumstances of 
each case”); see also, e.g., North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 310 
(4th Cir. 2010) (rejecting an injunction based on public nuisance because the activities complained 
of would not have substantially interfered with a person of ordinary health and sensibilities); Bar-
rett v. Atl. Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375, 383 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that plaintiff failed to establish 
the elements of a nuisance claim because it could not “demonstrate a substantial interference with 
the use or enjoyment of their property or an injurious effect on the public health, safety, or wel-
fare”); French v. Ass’n for Works of Mercy, 39 App. D.C. 406, 412 (D.C. Cir. 1912) (identifying 
the perspective for measuring a nuisance as that of “persons with ordinary sensibilities and of 
ordinary tastes and habits”). 
 270 Shatto, 509 N.E.2d at 899; accord, e.g., Cooper, 615 F.3d at 310; Barrett, 95 F.3d at 383; 
French, 39 App. D.C. at 412. 
 271 In addition to repealing the Eighteenth Amendment, the Twenty-First Amendment also 
expressly prohibits “The transportation or importation” of “intoxicating liquors” into “any State, 
Territory, or possession of the United States . . . in violation of the laws thereof.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. XXI. 
 272 See Sharon E. Conaway, Comment, The Continuing Search for Solutions to the Drinking 
Driver Tragedy and the Problem of Social Host Liability, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 403, 438 (1988) 
(noting that “no state prohibits the purchase of alcohol by a sober adult”). 
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bors.273 Likewise, products like radar detectors and fireworks—although not 
universally accepted—are legal in most states.274 
In contrast to alcohol, radar detectors, and fireworks,275 federal law 
categorizes marijuana as a nuisance.276 And although public opinion on ma-
rijuana is plainly changing, the laws of forty-six states consider recreational 
use of the drug a criminal act.277 In this case, it is Colorado—not its neigh-
bors—that is the outlier.278 
                                                                                                                           
 273 See Fowler, 575 So. 2d at 669. 
 274 Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L. 
REV. 655, 683 (2006) (stating that “only two jurisdictions statutorily prohibit radar detectors: 
Virginia and the District of Columbia”); John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Treaty-Based Exclusions from the 
Boundaries and Jurisdiction of the States, 71 UMKC L. REV. 763, 779–80 n.96 (2003) (noting 
that “consumer fireworks[] are generally legal in the majority of states”). 
 275 Although other banned chattels will invariably be drawn into interstate commerce, mariju-
ana’s high commercial value makes it more likely that the intrastate distribution of the drug will 
result in its introduction into interstate black markets. The drug is the most lucrative commercial 
cash crop in the United States. Venkataraman, supra note 55. These factors virtually guarantee 
that “the high demand in the interstate market will draw such marijuana [acquired intrastate] into 
that market” and will thereby have “a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national 
market for that commodity.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 19. 
 276 See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2012); infra notes 286–333 and accompanying text (describing how 
Congress has established that the recreational marijuana market constitutes an interstate nuisance). 
 277 Twenty-three states have chosen to legalize marijuana for medicinal purposes. State Medi-
cal Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx#3 [http://perma.cc/HNN7-AAPK]. This does 
not undermine the conclusion that the vast majority of states condemn the recreational use of 
marijuana. We believe that marijuana, like many other controlled substances, has legitimate medi-
cal purposes. A state’s decision to legalize a drug with known harmful side effects because it ben-
efits the ill is qualitatively different from a decision to legalize the drug for recreational use. As 
one commentator has observed: “Those who would use marijuana for treatment for nausea and 
vomiting resulting from chemotherapy treatments or for combating the wasting associated with 
AIDS . . . cannot be considered marijuana abusers.” James D. Abrams, Note, A Missed Opportuni-
ty: Medical Use of Marijuana Is Legally Defensible, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 883, 909 (2003). We 
agree. But if Colorado legalized Vicodin for recreational purposes and licensed dispensaries in all 
corners of the state to sell the drug, this would almost certainly create a transboundary nuisance. 
The fact that all fifty states (and federal law) permit medicinal use of the drug would not under-
mine the conclusion that a vast majority of jurisdictions would consider a recreational Vicodin 
market a nuisance. 
 278 Colorado has enjoyed a boom in “marijuana tourism.” Hughes, supra note 205. It should 
be noted that Colorado has enjoyed a surge in marijuana-seeking visitors, despite the fact that 
visitors who lack access to a private home have few places to smoke marijuana in Colorado, as the 
state bans public cannabis consumption and most hotels prohibit smoking marijuana on their 
premises. Jordan Schrader, Law Has Barrier to Pot Tourism, NEWS TRIB. (Mar. 16, 2014), http://
www.thenewstribune.com/2014/03/16/3098052/law-has-barrier-to-pot-tourism.html [http://perma.
cc/RVK5-NWLZ]. 
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II. COLORADO’S MARIJUANA-LEGALIZATION EXPERIMENT CONSTITUTES A 
TRANSBOUNDARY NUISANCE UNDER FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
Although federal courts “are not general common-law courts and do 
not possess a general power to develop and apply their own rules of deci-
sion,” the Constitution charges Article III courts with “develop[ing] federal 
common law” to govern “when there exists a ‘significant conflict between 
some federal policy or interest and the use of state law.’”279 It is well-settled 
that transboundary nuisances fall within this field.280 
The Supreme Court has promulgated a body of nuisance law regulat-
ing “activity harmful to . . . citizens’ health and welfare” which produce 
effects that cross state lines.281 “The elements of a claim based on the feder-
al common law of nuisance are simply that the defendant is carrying on an 
activity that is causing an injury or significant threat of injury to some cog-
nizable interest of the complainant.”282 This body of law closely tracks the 
common law of public nuisance applied by most state courts.283 
The Restatement of Torts defines public nuisance as “an unreasonable 
interference with a right common to the general public.”284 By facilitating 
                                                                                                                           
 279 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 312–13 (1981) (quoting Wal-
lis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)). 
 280 E.g., Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 271–72 (1974) (accusing a New York paper 
mill of polluting Lake Champlain); New Jersey v. City of New York (New Jersey II), 283 U.S. 
473, 476–77 (1931) (seeking to enjoin off-shore garbage dumping by New York that caused trash 
to wash ashore on New Jersey beaches); New York v. New Jersey, 249 U.S. 202, 202–03 (1919) 
(seeking to enjoin New Jersey’s discharge of sewage into New York Harbor); Georgia v. Tenn. 
Copper Co. (Tennessee Copper I), 206 U.S. 230, 238–39 (1907) (alleging poisonous gas emanat-
ing from a Tennessee plant caused damage in Georgia); Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri I), 180 U.S. 
208, 208–09 (1901) (alleging Illinois’s discharge of untreated sewage into the Mississippi River 
polluted drinking water in Missouri). 
 281 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2011). 
 282 Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 781 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Illi-
nois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 165 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated, 451 U.S. 304). 
 283 See, e.g., Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d at 781; Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 
1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Middlesex Cty. Sewage Auth. v. 
Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). As stated by the Seventh Circuit: 
Public nuisance traditionally has been understood to cover a tremendous range of 
subjects[,] . . . “includ[ing] interferences with . . . public morals, as in the case of 
houses of prostitution, illegal liquor establishments, gambling houses, indecent ex-
hibitions, bullfights, [or] unlicensed prize fights . . . [and interferences] with public 
convenience, as by obstructing a highway or a navigable stream, or creating a condi-
tion which makes travel unsafe or highly disagreeable . . . .” 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d at 771–72 (quoting PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 102, at 
643–45). 
 284 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
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the introduction of a widely forbidden controlled substance285 into interstate 
commerce, Colorado is committing a quintessential public nuisance as con-
templated by the criteria discussed above. 
A. Congress Has Established That Colorado’s Recreational Marijuana 
Market Constitutes an Interstate Nuisance 
“There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than 
that which surrounds the word ‘nuisance.’ . . . There is general agreement 
that it is incapable of any exact or comprehensive definition.”286 Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court historically relied on “often vague and indeter-
minate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence” to formulate 
this body of law.287 But “when Congress addresses a question previously 
governed by a decision rested on federal common law the need for such an 
unusual lawmaking by federal courts disappears.”288 Thus, “new federal 
laws . . . may in time preempt the field of federal common law of nui-
sance.”289 
As noted above, the bulk of the Supreme Court’s transboundary nui-
sance jurisprudence consists of air290 and water pollution cases.291 By estab-
lishing uniform national air and water quality standards in the Clean Air and 
Water Acts, Congress preempted the federal common law of nuisance in 
these areas, relieving the Court of it historic role of determining what 
amount of air and water pollution is acceptable.292 More importantly, these 
                                                                                                                           
 285 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2012) (listing marijuana as a “Schedule One” controlled substance); 
EDWARD M. BRECHER, LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS 413 (1972) (“By 1937, forty-six of the forty-
eight states . . . had laws against marijuana.”). 
 286 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 102, at 616. 
 287 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317. 
 288 Id. at 314. 
 289 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972). The “displacement 
of federal common law does not require the ‘same sort of evidence of a clear and manifest [con-
gressional] purpose’ demanded for preemption of state law.” Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 
2537 (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317); see also Peter Augustine Kraus, A Federal Preemp-
tion of State Tort Law Claims in Nuclear Industry: English v. General Electric Co., 33 B.C. L. 
REV. 468, 469 (1992) (“When the question of preemption involves areas of law customarily occu-
pied by the states, congressional intent to occupy the field exclusively must be ‘clear and mani-
fest.’” (quoting English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990))). 
 290 E.g., Tennessee Copper I, 206 U.S. at 238–39; see also Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 
R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1938) (holding that Canada was responsible for the air pollution caused by 
the Trail Smelter Company). 
 291 See Percival, supra note 46, at 717 (asserting that “the federal common law of interstate 
nuisance” met “its ultimate demise following the enactment of the Clean Water Act”). 
 292 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2536 (holding that the Clean Air Act preempts federal 
common law of nuisance with regard to interstate air pollution); Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314 
(holding that the Clean Water Act preempts federal common law of nuisance with regard to pollu-
tion of interstate bodies of water). 
2015] State-Controversy Jurisdiction and Marijuana Legalization 1873 
Acts divested the Court of jurisdiction over such matters, assigning primary 
responsibility for adjudicating interstate pollution disputes to the EPA.293 As 
the Court explained, the EPA, as “an expert agency, . . . . is surely better 
equipped” to apply the uniform standards created by the Clean Air and Wa-
ter Acts because “judges lack the scientific, economic, and technological 
resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this order.”294 
A nuisance suit challenging Colorado’s marijuana-legalization experi-
ment would confront the Court with a first of its kind, hybrid statutory-
common law problem. All of the Court’s original jurisdiction opinions to 
date involved situations in which the question of federal preemption pre-
sented an all-or-nothing proposition. Congress had either left the matter en-
tirely to the courts or had “completely occupied”295 the relevant field by 
statute.296 In contrast, an original action challenging Colorado’s pot market 
involves the application of both federal common law and statutory law. 
Some commentators contend that “the CSA must displace [claims] in-
volving marijuana” just as the Clean Air Act “displaces . . . claims over 
emissions.”297 This is not so. States owe “an affirmative duty”298 to protect 
their neighbors “against injurious acts by individuals from within [their] 
jurisdiction.”299 And the Constitution does not leave states dependent upon 
the whims of federal agents to protect them from incursions by sister states. 
Aggrieved states are constitutionally entitled to present such claims to an 
impartial forum.300 The Court concluded that the Clean Air and Water Acts 
displaced federal common law only because “[t]he statutory scheme estab-
lished by Congress provides a forum for the pursuit of [pollution] claims 
                                                                                                                           
 293 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539; Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 320. 
 294 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539–40. 
 295 Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 44 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating 
that preemption occurs when federal law “so completely occupie[s] a field that it le[aves] no room 
for additional . . . regulation”). 
 296 Compare Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 107 (“It may happen that new federal laws . . . may in 
time preempt the field of federal common law of nuisance. But until that comes to pass, federal 
courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nui-
sance by water pollution.”), with Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537 (“We hold that the 
Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law right to seek 
abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.”). 
 297 Adler, supra note 161. 
 298 Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1024 (1983). 
 299 Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1963; accord, e.g., Vermont, 417 U.S. at 270–71 (finding New 
York had a constitutional obligation to prevent a privately owned paper mill from polluting an 
interstate waterway); Tennessee Copper I, 206 U.S. at 238 (holding Tennessee had a constitutional 
obligation to prevent a private copper-smelting business from polluting the air of a neighboring 
state); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 518–19 (1851) 
(finding Virginia had a constitutional obligation to prevent a company operating a private toll 
bridge over the Ohio River from obstructing navigation). 
 300 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 325–26. 
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before expert agencies.”301 Schemes that leave an aggrieved state without 
“any forum in which to protect its interests” in the absence of “federal 
common law” will not be construed to displace the federal common law.302 
“When a [s]tate enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerog-
atives”—including the ability to employ diplomatic measures to combat 
transboundary nuisances.303 The Constitution dictates that “[t]hese sovereign 
prerogatives are now lodged in the [f]ederal [g]overnment.”304 But the Court 
has also recognized that it is insufficient to simply entrust federal agents to 
protect the states’ “quasi-sovereign interests.”305 It is critical that a forum ex-
ists—whether the Supreme Court or an expert agency—where a state can 
seek redress for grievances with its neighbors.306 
Unlike air and water pollution cases, Congress has not divested the Su-
preme Court of jurisdiction over marijuana-related disputes by “provid[ing] a 
forum for the pursuit of . . . claims”307 before an “expert agency.”308 But Con-
gress also has not left the question of whether facilitating an intrastate pot 
market constitutes an interstate nuisance to the “vague and indeterminate nui-
sance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence.”309 Congressional find-
ings definitively answer an interstate-nuisance question when Congress 
“‘speak[s] directly to [the] question’ at issue.”310 In the instant case, Congress 
has spoken directly to that question by concluding that the introduction of 
marijuana—even in an intrastate market—constitutes an interstate nuisance 
as the federal common law contemplates that term.311 
The CSA criminalizes the cultivation, possession, or sale of any quan-
tity of marijuana.312 The statute also contains several important findings of 
fact concerning the effect of marijuana on public health and its propensity 
to be drawn into the stream of interstate commerce. 
                                                                                                                           
 301 Id. at 326; accord Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539. 
 302 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 325–26 (citing Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 104, 107). 
 303 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007). 
 304 Id. 
 305 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 336 (quoting Tennessee Copper I, 206 U.S. at 237); see also 
Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 104. 
 306 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–19 (citing Tennessee Copper I, 206 U.S. at 237). 
 307 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 326. 
 308 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539. 
 309 See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317. 
 310 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537 (alterations in original) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. 
v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)). 
 311 See 21 U.S.C. § 801(2) (2012) (stating that the “importation, manufacture, distribution, 
and possession” of marijuana has “a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general 
welfare of the American people”); id. § 801(3)–(4) (finding that marijuana “distributed locally 
usually ha[s] been transported in interstate commerce immediately before [its] distribution,” and 
that the intrastate “distribution and possession of” marijuana “contribute[s] to swelling the inter-
state traffic in such substances”). 
 312 21 U.S.C. § 812(c). 
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The Restatement of Torts defines public nuisance as “an unreasonable 
interference with a right common to the general public.”313 Factors applica-
ble to the determination of whether particular conduct constitutes such in-
terference include: 
(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with 
the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public 
comfort or the public convenience, or (b) whether the conduct is 
proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation, or 
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced 
a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has 
reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public right.314 
Congress’s findings with respect to marijuana “speak[] directly” to each of 
these factors.315 
First, Congress’s findings demonstrate that Colorado’s recreational 
marijuana market significantly interferes with the public health of neighbor-
ing states. Congress has expressly found that the “importation, manufacture, 
distribution, and possession” of marijuana has “a substantial and detri-
mental effect on the health and general welfare of the American people.”316 
This effect extends well beyond Colorado’s borders. Congress concluded 
that marijuana “distributed locally usually ha[s] been transported in inter-
state commerce immediately before [its] distribution,” and that the intrastate 
“distribution and possession of” marijuana “contribute[s] to swelling the 
interstate traffic in such substances.”317 
In 2005, the Supreme Court affirmed these findings in Gonzales v. 
Raich.318 As Justice Scalia explained in that case, pot is a “fungible com-
modit[y]” and as such, marijuana that enters commerce in an intrastate mar-
ket “is never more than an instant from the interstate market—and this is so 
whether or not the possession is for . . . lawful use under the laws of a par-
ticular [s]tate.”319 This interstate effect derives from pot’s “high demand”—
and high street value.320 The drug is the most lucrative commercial crop in 
the United States.321 This guarantees that “the high demand in the interstate 
market will draw marijuana” acquired intrastate “into that market” and will 
                                                                                                                           
 313 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B. 
 314 Id. 
 315 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp., 436 U.S. at 625). 
 316 21 U.S.C. § 801(2) (emphasis added); see also id. § 812 (categorizing marijuana as a 
“Schedule 1” controlled substance). 
 317 Id. § 801(3)–(4). 
 318 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005). 
 319 Id. at 40 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 320 Id. at 19 (majority opinion). 
 321 Venkataraman, supra note 55. 
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thereby have “a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national 
market for that commodity.”322 The CSA thus establishes that Colorado’s 
pot market constitutes a significant health threat to neighboring states. 
Second, the commercial (and noncommercial) exploitation of marijua-
na is proscribed by statute. The CSA criminalizes the cultivation, posses-
sion, or sale of any quantity of marijuana.323 Raich upheld this law against a 
challenge that it infringed upon state sovereignty.324 The Court even found 
that the law validly proscribed the state-sanctioned, noncommercial cultiva-
tion of six marijuana plants in a private garden for personal consumption.325 
In contrast to Raich’s tiny, private, non-commercial garden, Colorado’s 
wide-open commercial pot market is a multi-billion dollar industry—likely 
“the fastest-growing industry in America.”326 Accordingly, it easily falls 
within the valid reach of the CSA and demonstrates that the sale of marijua-
na is proscribed by statute, notwithstanding local law. 
Third, Colorado’s recreational marijuana market is both continuous 
and producing long-lasting harms. Colorado’s experiment does not come 
with a sunset provision.327 It is intended to continue unabated into the fu-
ture. The program is enshrined in the State’s Constitution.328 Moreover, Big 
Cannabis is quickly establishing itself as the state’s most powerful commer-
cial interest.329 The market’s intended permanent nature establishes that it 
will produce long-term harms. Until it is abated, Colorado pot will, in Con-
gress’s judgment, continue to “have a substantial and detrimental effect on 
the health and general welfare of . . . people” of neighboring states.330 
Finally, the record demonstrates that Colorado is aware of the effects 
that its recreational marijuana market is having on its neighbors.331 The 
Task Force charged with implementing Colorado’s program acknowledged 
                                                                                                                           
 322 Raich, 545 U.S. at 19. 
 323 21 U.S.C. § 812(c); 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012). 
 324 Raich, 545 U.S. at 41 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 325 Id. at 7 (majority opinion). 
 326 Sandra Fish, Legal Marijuana, a Multi-Billion-Dollar Industry, Still Faces Legal Hurdles, 
AL JAZEERA AM. (June 11, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/6/11/marijuana-industry
growing.html [http://perma.cc/G6UJ-FT7W]. 
 327 A sunset provision is a clause in a statute dictating that it “automatically terminates at the 
end of a fixed period unless it is formally renewed.” Sunset Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 25. 
 328 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16. 
 329 Fish, supra note 326; see also Carroll, supra note 6. 
 330 See 21 U.S.C. § 801(2). 
 331 The officials charged with defending Colorado’s regime openly acknowledge the extrater-
ritorial costs of the state’s venture. John Suthers, the State’s Attorney General from 2005 to 2015, 
asserted that it is “clear that . . . Colorado is becoming a significant exporter of marijuana to the 
rest of the country.” Coffman, supra note 207. Suthers’s successor agreed with his assessment, 
admitting that “[i]llegal drug dealers are simply hiding in plain sight, attempting to use [Colora-
do’s] legalized market as cover.” Coffman, supra note 208. 
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that “[a]dditional actions” are necessary “to limit diversion out of Colora-
do.”332 But short of suggesting signage advising buyers not to take marijua-
na out of the state, the Task Force has provided no guidance regarding how 
to accomplish this goal.333 Thus, Colorado is on notice that its program is 
harming its neighbors. 
Congress has spoken directly to the dispositive question presented here 
by making factual findings concerning intrastate marijuana markets that 
correspond to every facet of the common-law’s definition of public nui-
sance. As such, it has answered the question of whether Colorado’s experi-
ment constitutes an interstate nuisance. 
B. Even in the Absence of the CSA’s Findings, Colorado’s Marijuana-
Legalization Experiment Constitutes an Interstate Nuisance  
Under Federal Common Law 
The federal common law of nuisance is essentially a repository of 
common law public nuisance concepts with which a majority of jurisdic-
tions find common ground.334 One commentator has dismissed the exter-
nalities associated with Colorado’s marijuana trade as “weak gruel as far as 
nuisance claims go.”335 But few legal concepts are more universally accept-
ed than the principle that allowing one’s territory to serve as a location from 
which illicit drugs are introduced into surrounding communities constitutes 
a quintessential public nuisance.336 State and federal reporters are replete 
                                                                                                                           
 332 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 209, at 50. 
 333 See id. 
 334 E.g., Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 855 (adopting the definition of public nuisance found in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts); Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d at 781 (using the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts to define public nuisance); Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 616 F.2d at 1235 (hold-
ing defendant liable for public nuisance based on the Restatement’s definition of public nuisance). 
 335 Adler, supra note 161. 
 336 E.g., United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290–91 (1996) (noting that in many circum-
stances forfeiture of property used to commit a federal drug felony may abate a nuisance); United 
States v. Abdullah, 903 F. Supp. 913, 918 (D. Md. 1995) (applying an enhanced penalty based on 
defendant’s prior conviction for maintaining a drug house that constituted a common nuisance); 
Gonzalez v. State, 134 So. 3d 350, 354 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (discussing defendant’s prior con-
viction for visiting or maintaining a common nuisance in the form of a drug house); Olson v. 
State, 56 A.3d 576, 611 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (recognizing a statute “criminalizing the 
maintenance of a common nuisance in the form of a drug house”); State v. Curtis, 2005 Ohio 604, 
604 (Ct. App. 2005) (asserting that a police officer had sufficient suspicion to detain defendant 
based on facts that included a prior “use nuisance” order relating to drug activities in the defend-
ant’s residence); Lewis v. City of University City, 145 S.W.3d 25, 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (recog-
nizing University City’s interest in abating an ongoing nuisance by not allowing drug homes); 
City of Miami v. Keshbro, 717 So. 2d 601, 605 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998) (considering the operation of 
a drug house as a nuisance and thus not part of the property owner’s bundle of rights); City of 
Milwaukee v. Arrieh, 565 N.W.2d 291, 292 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (applying Wisconsin law that 
declares a nuisance to be “any building or structure that is used to facilitate the delivery, distribu-
tion or manufacture of a controlled substance and any building or structure where those acts take 
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with opinions abating such nuisances.337 Many even allowed the govern-
ment to take title to offending property from landholders permitting such 
activities.338 
These opinions rest on sound judgment. While the popular culture fre-
quently portrays pot as “a harmless diversion,”339 scientific studies reveal 
that the truth is far more nuanced. A recent study published in the New Eng-
land Journal of Medicine concluded that marijuana use causes “long-lasting 
changes in brain function that can jeopardize educational, professional and 
social achievements.”340 Moreover, contrary to popular claims that pot is 
not addictive,341 “the evidence clearly indicates that long-term marijuana 
use can lead to addiction.”342 There is widespread scientific recognition “of 
a bona fide cannabis withdrawal syndrome”—symptoms of which include 
“irritability, sleeping difficulties, dysphoria, craving, and anxiety” and 
“which makes cessation difficult and contributes to relapse.”343 This addic-
tive hold is particularly strong on users under twenty-five.344 Half of pa-
                                                                                                                           
place”); Lew v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42, 44–45 (Ct. App. 1993) (considering it a well-
accepted fact that in California a drug house is a nuisance); People v. Griffin, 633 N.E.2d 773, 775 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (affirming an injunction against a defendant when illegal drug transactions 
occurred in the defendant’s building). Famously liberal San Francisco recently brought a nuisance 
suit against a McDonald’s in the city’s Haight-Ashbury neighborhood because the restaurant al-
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on Haight Street Is a Magnet for Homeless Youth, Drugs, S.F. CHRON. (May 13, 2015), 
http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/McDonald-s-on-Haight-Street-is-a-magnet-for-
6262459.php [http://perma.cc/LF8L-XJ65] (reporting on a nuisance action filed against a McDon-
ald’s where illicit drug transactions occurred). 
 337 See supra note 336 and accompanying text (collecting examples). 
 338 See, e.g., Ursery, 518 U.S. at 290–91. 
 339 Jesse Singal, In ‘Marijuana Legalization,’ Hard Truths for All Sides of the Debate, DAILY 
BEAST (July, 22, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/22/in-marijuana-legalization-
hard-truths-for-all-sides-of-the-debate.html [http://perma.cc/E8EM-X8T7]. 
 340 Volkow et al., supra note 64, at 2225. 
 341 See Rochelle Koff, John Morgan Says ‘Nobody’s Addicted’ to Marijuana, POLITIFACT 
FLA. (Sept. 22, 2013), http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2013/oct/08/john-morgan/
john-morgan-says-nobodys-addicted-marijuana/ [http://perma.cc/FU4L-DCE7]; see also Mauer, 
supra note 5, at 701 (noting that “we have marijuana being celebrated in popular culture”). 
 342 Volkow et al., supra note 64, at 2219 (citing C. Lopez-Quintero et al., Probability and 
Predictors of Transition from First Use to Dependence on Nicotine, Alcohol, Cannabis, and Co-
caine: Results of the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions, 115 
NAT’L EPIDEMIOLOGIC SURVEY ON ALCOHOL & RELATED CONDITIONS 120, 120–30 (2011)); 
accord Chris Roberts, Hooked on Legalization: Marijuana Is Addictive, Whether Legalization 
Backers Admit It or Not, S.F. WEEKLY (July, 23, 2014), http://www.sfweekly.com/sanfrancisco/
hooked-on-legalization-marijuana-is-addictive-whether-legalization-backers-admit-it-or-not/Content
?oid=2989017 [http://perma.cc/U92A-9P94]. 
 343 Volkow et al., supra note 64, at 2219; accord Alan J. Budney et al., Marijuana Depend-
ence and Its Treatment, 4 ADDICTION SCI. & CLINICAL PRAC. 4, 10 (2007). 
 344 Budney et al., supra note 343, at 4. 
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tients who seek treatment for marijuana addiction are under twenty-five 
years of age.345 
Pot’s addictive properties come at a high price for both users and for 
society at large. Imaging studies of regular pot users’ brains reveal “de-
creased activity in prefrontal regions and reduced volumes in the hippo-
campus.”346 This damage results in “impaired neural connectivity . . . in 
specific regions of the brain”—particularly those responsible for “learning 
and memory” and “self-conscious awareness.”347 Such brain damage mani-
fests itself in reduced cognitive function, “impairments in memory and at-
tention,” and “significant declines in IQ.”348 Those who become dependent 
on marijuana as adolescents can lose up to eight IQ points by the time they 
reach adulthood.349 These “long-lasting changes in brain function . . . jeop-
ardize education, professional, and social achievements,” yielding predicta-
ble negative social consequences.350 “A clear association between cannabis 
use and the development of psychotic disorders has been repeatedly demon-
strated.”351 And “[y]oung people who have dropped out of school . . . have 
particularly high rates of frequent marijuana use.”352 These externalities 
directly correlate to what many consider “the defining challenge of our 
time”—income inequality.353 Studies reveal that frequent marijuana use 
leads to “lower income, greater need for socioeconomic assistance, unem-
ployment, criminal behavior, and lower satisfaction with life.”354 
In the United States, “cannabis dependence is twice as prevalent as de-
pendence on any other illicit psychoactive substance.”355 Accordingly, its 
negative social impact dwarfs those of other illicit controlled substances.356 
                                                                                                                           
 345 Id. 
 346 Volkow et al., supra note 64, at 2220. 
 347 Id. 
 348 Id.; accord LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO, VOL. 2, supra note 195, at 36. 
 349 LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO, VOL. 2, supra note 195, at 36. 
 350 Volkow et al., supra note 64, at 2225; accord Budney et al., supra note 343, at 4. 
 351 Alan J. Budney & Catherine Stanger, Cannabis Use and Misuse, in IACAPAP E-TEXTBOOK 
OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT MENTAL HEALTH ch. G.2, at 8 (Joseph M. Rey ed., 2012); accord 
Volkow et al., supra note 64, at 2221 (“Regular marijuana use is associated with an increased risk of 
anxiety and depression.” (citing George C. Patton et al., Cannabis Use and Mental Health in Young 
People: Cohort Study, 325 BRIT. MED. J. 1195, 1195–98 (2002))). 
 352 Volkow et al., supra note 64, at 2221. 
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HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/04/obama-income-
inequality_n_4384843.html [http://perma.cc/C7EY-KMF6] (noting President Obama has called 
income inequality as “the defining challenge of our time”). 
 354 Volkow et al., supra note 64, at 2221; accord Budney et al., supra note 343, at 4; Budney 
& Stanger, supra note 351, at 8. 
 355 Budney et al., supra note 343, at 5. 
 356 See Adam Paul Weisman, I Was a Drug-Hype Junkie: 48 Hours on Crack Street, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Oct. 6, 1986, at 14, 16 (stating marijuana is America’s most popular illegal drug). 
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These externalities result not because pot is intrinsically more dangerous than 
drugs like heroin and cocaine—it is not357—but rather because its “legal sta-
tus allows for more widespread exposure.”358 The popular culture’s embrace 
of legalized pot359 may portend a dire forecast. “As policy shifts toward legal-
ization of marijuana, it is reasonable and probably prudent to hypothesize that 
its use will increase and that, by extension, so will the number of persons for 
whom there will be negative health consequences.”360 These consequences 
will be borne by all—users and nonusers alike—in the form of increased so-
cial assistance361 and higher health insurance premiums.362 
The evidence thus demonstrates both that the marijuana trade qualifies 
as a nuisance as defined by federal common law—i.e., it is “harmful to . . . 
citizens’ health and welfare”363—and that its negative externalities spill over 
into neighboring states.364 
The central tenet of nuisance law is the ancient maxim sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas—“so use your own as not to injure another’s proper-
ty.”365 This adage is also the rock on which the federal common law of nui-
sance is built.366 Colorado’s experiment deviates from this covenant. While 
the state reaps the benefits of its venture—some $53 million in tax revenue 
last year367—its windfall is made possible by harm inflicted upon neighbor-
ing states which are forced to endure the resulting harmful externalities.368 
The norms of public-nuisance law demand that if Colorado is allowed to 
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Merrill, supra note 27, at 953. 
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 368 LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO, VOL. 1, supra note 186, at 4–5, 38, 52. 
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continue to enjoy the benefits of its venture, it must share some of this 
bounty with its neighbors. 
III. DAMAGES ARE THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY 
Historically, most successful Supreme Court original actions culminat-
ed in injunctions abating the nuisance.369 But Colorado’s experiment pre-
sents a problem never confronted by the Court in an original nuisance ac-
tion. Colorado law—indeed the State’s Constitution—specifically permits 
the possession and sale of marijuana.370 Effective abatement of the nuisance 
thus poses three requirements: an amendment to Colorado’s Constitution, 
affirmative legislative changes to its criminal code,371 and enforcement of 
these new statutes by state police officers. None of the prior original juris-
diction cases where the Court issued injunctive relief to abate a nuisance 
required affirmative legislative action by the defendant-States (much less a 
constitutional amendment) or implementation of federal mandates by state 
law enforcement officers. 
Rather, in all such prior cases, the Court enforced its judgments direct-
ly using its contempt power to “bind the officers, agents, and citizens of the 
state from engaging in the proscribed conduct.”372 This was possible even in 
cases involving nuisances committed by private actors because such cases 
typically involved a small number of offenders who were joined as parties 
to the suit and were likewise subject to the Court’s contempt power.373 
                                                                                                                           
 369 See Cheren, supra note 34, at 161 (noting that injunctive relief is a common remedy for 
states prevailing in original actions). The Supreme Court has awarded damages to states in origi-
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 370 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16. 
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 372 See Cheren, supra note 34, at 161 (discussing how the Court has used its contempt powers 
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 373 See, e.g., Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 270–71 (1974) (joining a privately owned 
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Tenn. Copper Co. (Tennessee Copper II), 237 U.S. 474, 475–76 (1915) (joining three private 
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nessee); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 518–19 (1851) 
(joining a private Virginia toll bridge company in an original action between Pennsylvania and 
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In contrast, thousands of individuals and businesses traffic Colorado 
pot to neighboring states.374 It would be impossible to join all violators as 
parties. And the Supreme Court Marshal cannot be expected to single-
handedly enforce a renewed statewide marijuana ban.375 
In our view, the relief sought by Nebraska and Oklahoma—an order 
effectively compelling the Colorado legislature to amend its laws to prohibit 
marijuana sales and commanding state agents to enforce such prohibi-
tions—would run afoul of constitutional prohibitions against federal com-
mandeering of the states.376 In contrast, an award of damages designed to 
compensate neighboring states for losses caused by the influx of Colorado 
pot entails no constitutional obstacles.377 In advocating this position, we 
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[s]tate.” Id.; accord Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 130 (1987). Although Kansas v. Colo-
rado did not specifically address Alden’s contention that state sovereign immunity is broader than 
the text of the Eleventh Amendment, in earlier opinions the Court observed that “[b]y ratifying the 
Constitution, the States gave [the Supreme] Court complete judicial power to adjudicate disputes 
among [them] . . . and this power includes the capacity to provide one [s]tate a remedy for the 
breach of another.” Texas, 482 U.S. at 128. Thus, the states waived their sovereign immunity to 
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enjoy sovereign immunity in original actions, coming as it did on the heels of Alden, constitutes an 
implicit reaffirmation of its prior holdings that the states’ pre-constitutional immunity in such 
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posit that the Court should look to the Coase Theorem—a principle de-
signed to efficiently settle disputes involving externalities caused by pollu-
tion—to formulate appropriate remedies for states harmed by Colorado’s 
experiment. 
A. The Constitution’s Anti-Commandeering Proscriptions Deny the Court 
the Power to Compel Colorado to Enact or Enforce Laws  
Banning the Possession or Sale of Marijuana 
Although the federal government “has substantial powers to govern the 
[n]ation directly . . . the Constitution has never been understood to confer 
upon Congress the ability to require the [s]tates to govern according to [its] 
instructions.”378 The “[s]tates are not mere political subdivisions” of the 
federal government, and “[s]tate governments are neither regional offices 
nor administrative agencies of the federal government.”379 Thus, federal 
authorities “may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the 
[s]tates by directly compelling them to enact . . . a federal regulatory pro-
gram.’”380 The Constitution likewise denies federal authorities the power to 
conscript state law enforcement officers by “press[ing] [them] into federal 
service . . . for the administration of federal programs.”381 
To date, the Court’s anti-commandeering jurisprudence has all in-
volved congressional attempts to conscript state authorities.382 Yet, these 
same principles necessarily preclude federal judicial commandeering of 
state officials to implement a federal directive. In 2011, the Court implicitly 
acknowledged such limitations in Brown v. Plata.383 The Plata Court wres-
tled with the question of what remedies were available to prisoners follow-
ing a judicial finding that overcrowding in California prisons had become 
so excessive that it violated the Eight Amendment’s prohibition against cru-
el and unusual punishments.384 
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with “the Consent of Congress.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. In 1918—more than seven decades 
before the birth of its anti-commandeering jurisprudence—the Court intimated that the limiting 
principles articulated by those decisions are inapplicable to congressional acts passed to enforce 
existing interstate compacts. “[T]he lawful exertion of . . . authority by Congress to compel com-
pliance with [an] obligation resulting from [a] contract between . . . two [s]tates which it approved 
is not circumscribed by the powers reserved to the [s]tates [by the Tenth Amendment].” Virginia, 
246 U.S. at 602. 
 383 See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1938 (2011). 
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Plata affirmed a district court order mandating the release of some 
37,000 prisoners within two years to reduce the prison population to consti-
tutionally permissible levels.385 The district court recognized that California 
could “eliminate overcrowding” by simply “build[ing] more prisons,” but 
implicitly acknowledged that the release order was necessary because 
commanding state authorities to construct more prisons or expend funds on 
specific projects are state legislative prerogatives that fall outside the feder-
al judiciary’s power.386 This limitation on federal power is consistent with 
the anti-commandeering jurisprudence’s recognition that “the Constitution 
simply does not give Congress”—or Article III courts—the authority to 
compel states to expend their “resources [to] enforce federal law.”387 
Nebraska’s and Oklahoma’s pending suit ignores this limitation. Alt-
hough claiming that they “are not suggesting the CSA requires Colorado to 
criminalize marijuana,”388 their complaint—citing “conflicts with the CSA 
and corresponding federal laws and treaty obligations”389—paradoxically 
seeks an order compelling Colorado to do just that. They “pray that the 
State of Colorado . . . [b]e enjoined from any and all application of Sections 
16(4) and (5) of Article XVIII of the Colorado Constitution.”390 Section 
16(4) dictates that the “[m]anufacture, possession, or purchase of marijua-
na” by “a person who is twenty-one years of age or older” is “not unlawful 
and shall not be an offense under Colorado law.”391 Section 16(5) prohibits 
the prosecution of marijuana sellers so long as they demonstrate compliance 
with requirements concerning “[s]ecurity . . . for marijuana establish-
ments,”392 the prevention of “diversion . . . to persons under the age of 
twenty-one,”393 and “[l]abeling . . . [of] products.”394 The sale of marijuana 
by those who do not comply with these requirements remains a crime under 
Colorado law.395 
As Professor Michael Dorf explained, “[t]he Colorado laws purporting 
to ‘legalize’ marijuana in fact do no such thing.”396 They simply “modify 
state laws that previously prohibited marijuana, so that now people who 
comply with the state’s regulatory requirements will not be subject to state 
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prosecution for marijuana cultivation, distribution, or possession.”397 En-
joining these provisions would restore the full-scale criminalization of mari-
juana that existed before Colorado amended its Constitution. 
Nebraska and Oklahoma ultimately make no bones about the true aim of 
their suit. They explicitly ask the Court to restore “the status quo ante”—i.e., 
“the situation that existed before”398 Colorado decriminalized recreational 
marijuana.399 Such relief is necessary, they contend, to prevent Colorado from 
“roguishly . . . dismantling” the CSA.400 But the anti-commandeering juris-
prudence unequivocally recognizes that federal authorities “may not . . . 
‘commandeer the legislative processes of the [s]tates by directly compelling 
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’”401 
Some commentators assert that the anti-commandeering doctrine en-
dows Colorado’s marijuana regime with complete immunity from trans-
boundary nuisance suits.402 Commenting on an earlier draft of this Article, 
Professor Dorf predicted that a damages action may also “founder on the 
anti-commandeering principle” because “holding a state liable for failing to 
enact or enforce federal law seems tantamount to obliging the state to enact 
or enforce federal law.”403 We respectfully contend that Professor Dorf’s 
prediction misapprehends the ultimate source of the proscriptions identified 
by the Court in its transboundary nuisance cases. 
The Court’s anti-commandeering opinions involve situations where 
Congress—relying on its power to regulate interstate commerce and noth-
ing more—conscripted state agents into the federal bureaucracy.404 In con-
trast, the states’ obligation not to subject their neighbors to transboundary 
nuisances stems from the Constitution itself. “When the states by their un-
ion made the forcible abatement of . . . nuisances” committed by sister 
states “impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to whatever 
might be done.”405 Thus, the Constitution imposes “an affirmative duty” on 
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every state to protect its neighbors from harm emanating from its territo-
ry.406 This includes “a duty to protect other [s]tates against injurious acts by 
individuals from within its jurisdiction.”407 
The imposition of this duty does not offend the anti-commandeering 
principle because it stems from the Constitution. “Constitutional provisions 
that impose affirmative duties on the [s]tates are hardly inconsistent with 
the notion of reserved powers.”408 Hence, a judgment against Colorado im-
pugning its commercial pot market because it creates a transboundary nui-
sance would not run afoul of any constitutional prohibition. An obligation 
imposed by the Constitution cannot be unconstitutional.409 
The notion that Colorado’s experiment violates a constitutional obliga-
tion will strike some as counterintuitive. Congress, after all, determined that 
intrastate marijuana markets constitute a transboundary nuisance.410 But the 
Constitution invests the Supreme Court and Congress with the “sovereign 
prerogative[]” to promulgate standards resolving nuisance disputes between 
states.411 
In 1907, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, the Supreme Court conclud-
ed that by permitting its citizens to release noxious gases into Georgia, Ten-
nessee violated its constitutional obligation not to commit transboundary 
nuisances.412 Today, Tennessee’s offending emissions would constitute an 
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interstate nuisance per se because they would violate the Clean Air Act.413 
The fact that Congress has enacted legislation categorizing the conduct as a 
transboundary nuisance would not undermine the Court’s conclusion. The 
Constitution entrusts the Supreme Court to promulgate common law nui-
sance rules to resolve the “bickerings and animosities” that will inevitably 
“spring up among the members of the Union.”414 And Congress has the 
power to preempt “question[s] previously governed by a decision rested on 
[the] federal common law.” 415 Thus, Congress’s conclusion that the conduct 
at issue constitutes an interstate nuisance does not undermine the Court’s 
holding that Tennessee violated its constitutional duty. It confirms it. 
Similarly, by determining that Colorado’s pot market constitutes an in-
terstate nuisance, Congress preempted a “question” that would otherwise be 
“governed by . . . federal common law,” categorizing the conduct at issue a 
transboundary nuisance in violation of the Constitution.416 
Nonetheless, as Plata demonstrates, even when the Constitution itself 
imposes obligations upon states, the anti-commandeering doctrine limits the 
remedies federal courts can provide. When states fail to fulfill their obliga-
tions, federal courts can provide relief to injured parties—but only relief that 
they can enforce directly using their own resources.417 They cannot “press [a 
state’s police] into federal service.”418 Thus, in an original action, the Su-
preme Court can only prescribe remedies that it can directly enforce utilizing 
its own resources.419 The Supreme Court lacks the resources to directly en-
                                                                                                                           
 413 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535–36 (2011). Similarly, whether 
Illinois’s discharge of sewage into the Mississippi River, as at issue in Missouri v. Illinois (Mis-
souri II), 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906), constituted a transboundary nuisance would now turn upon 
whether the discharges exceeded the limits prescribed by the Clean Water Act. See City of Mil-
waukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981). 
 414 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 93, at 478. 
 415 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314. 
 416 See id. We posit that congressional mandates designed to mediate interstate nuisance dis-
putes that would otherwise be governed by the federal common law are different in character than 
other mandates based on Article I powers. This is particularly so when the mandate at issue is 
invoked by a sister state in an interstate dispute, rather than by federal authorities. 
 417 For example, when a state successfully prevails in a transboundary nuisance action before 
the EPA, the judgment is enforced by obtaining a federal court order imposing fines “to induce 
[defendants] to comply with injunctions or other judicial orders designed to modify behavior.” 
U.S. Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 613 (1992). 
 418 Printz, 521 U.S. at 905. The separation of powers doctrine similarly dictates that the Court 
cannot compel the Executive Branch to alleviate the problem by enforcing the CSA. See supra 
note 213 and accompanying text (asserting that Nebraska and Oklahoma have not pled their inju-
ries with the level of particularity required to invoke the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction). 
 419 When it has awarded injunctive relief in past original actions, the Court was able to en-
force the order directly using its contempt power to “bind the officers, agents, and citizens of the 
state from engaging in the proscribed conduct.” Cheren, supra note 34, at 161. Bringing an end to 
Colorado’s commercial pot market will require deploying state law enforcement officers to en-
force laws recriminalizing marijuana. The Court lacks the resources to enforce these laws directly. 
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force an order enjoining thousands of private actors who are not parties to the 
suit from growing, possessing, or selling marijuana in Colorado.420 
But as Plata also demonstrates, this limitation does not mean that the 
Constitution leaves Colorado’s sister states with no remedy. In Plata, the 
anti-commandeering doctrine did not bar the Court from entering judgment 
against California because the prohibition against inflicting “cruel and unu-
sual punishments”—like the affirmative duty to protect neighboring states 
from transboundary harm—is imposed on the states by the Constitution it-
self.421 Nonetheless, even in such cases the anti-commandeering doctrine 
limits the remedies the Court can award to those it can enforce directly us-
ing its own resources.422 The Court could not simply order California to 
“build more prisons.”423 Such a command would have required “comman-
deer[ing] the legislative processes of the [s]tate[].”424 But this did not pre-
vent the Court from providing a remedy to the victims of the state’s uncon-
stitutional conduct. The Court possessed the means to directly enforce an 
order compelling the release of prisoners to alleviate overcrowding in Cali-
fornia’s penitentiaries.425 
                                                                                                                           
 420 Like the present controversy, many of the Court’s past original actions stemmed from a 
defendant-State’s failure to prevent its own private businesses from causing cross-border nuisanc-
es. See, e.g., Vermont, 417 U.S. at 270–71 (privately owned New York paper mill); Tennessee 
Copper II, 237 U.S. at 475–76 (three private Tennessee copper-smelting businesses); Wheeling & 
Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 518 (Virginia company operating a private toll bridge 
over the Ohio River). But these cases typically involved a small number of businesses that were 
also joined as parties to the action. E.g., Vermont, 417 U.S. at 270–71; Tennessee Copper I, 206 
U.S. at 238; Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 518. Thus, the Court was able 
to use its contempt powers to directly enforce its judgments without conscripting assistance from 
the defendant-State’s law enforcement. See Cheren, supra note 34, at 161 (discussing how the 
Court has used its contempt powers to enforce judgments against recalcitrant states). 
 421 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (stating “cruel and unusual punishments” shall not be “inflict-
ed”); see also Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (noting that “the Fourteenth Amend-
ment applies” the Eighth Amendment’s “restrictions to the [s]tates”); Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923 
(entering judgment against California because the prohibition against inflicting cruel and unusual 
punishments is imposed on the states by the Constitution). 
 422 As the great Henry Hart, Jr. observed, some constitutional rights by their very nature man-
date a judicial remedy when violated, but this does not dictate that “the denial of one [particular] 
remedy, while another is left open,” violates the Constitution. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of 
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 
1362, 1366 (1953). The denial of a particular remedy desired by a litigant, in favor of a different 
remedy, “can rarely be of constitutional dimension.” Id. This lesson seems to have eluded Nebras-
ka and Oklahoma. 
 423 See Coleman, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 951 (noting that California could “eliminate overcrowd-
ing” by simply “build[ing] more prisons,” but implicitly acknowledging that the release order was 
necessary because commanding state authorities to construct more prisons or expend funds on 
specific projects were state legislative decisions that fell outside of the judiciary’s power). 
 424 New York, 505 U.S. at 161. 
 425 Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923. 
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Likewise, the Court cannot restore marijuana prohibition in Colorado 
without conscripting the state’s police force into federal service.426 But the 
Court does possess the resources to directly enforce an award of damag-
es.427 Such a judgment falls well within the Court’s competence and re-
spects the equal status of Colorado and its sister states as co-sovereigns. 
B. The Court Should Look to the Coase Theorem to Fashion an 
Economically Efficient Remedy for the Cross-Border  
Trafficking of Colorado Pot 
In 1960, Ronald Coase propounded his signature Theorem for Exter-
nalities.428 Coase challenged the paradigmatic approach to the law of nui-
sance. In the years that followed, the Coase Theorem fundamentally altered 
that field of law.429 
Coase’s chief criticism of the common law’s traditional conception of 
nuisance is that it viewed such cases two-dimensionally to intrinsically in-
volve “a perpetrator and a victim.”430 He posited that every nuisance suit, in 
fact, involves “a problem of a reciprocal nature”; in every nuisance action 
there are two potential victims.431 To illustrate this point, Coase invoked the 
example of Sturges v. Bridgman,432 an English case decided in 1879, involv-
ing a dispute between a doctor and confectioner occupying adjoining lots.433 
The confectioner’s business produced noise and vibrations that disturbed the 
doctor’s clinic.434 Coase argued that any resolution would inevitably inflict 
harm on one of the parties.435 If the court denied the doctor relief, his business 
would be thwarted.436 On the other hand, “[t]o avoid harming the doctor” by 
enjoining the confectioner’s operation “would inflict harm on the confection-
                                                                                                                           
 426 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 905. 
 427 In 1904 in South Dakota v. North Carolina, the Court instructed the Supreme Court Mar-
shal to seize and auction railroad stock owned by North Carolina to satisfy a damages judgment 
awarded to South Dakota. 192 U.S. at 321–22. 
 428 See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 68, at 2. Coase was awarded the Nobel Prize in Eco-
nomic Sciences in 1991 “for his discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs 
and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy.” The Sveriges 
Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1991, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (2014), 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1991/ [http://perma.cc/Y2QY-EYTK]. 
 429 See Coltman v. Comm’r, 980 F.2d 1134, 1137 (7th Cir. 1992); Kelman, supra note 69, at 
669; Levy & Friedman, supra note 69, at 493; Pearl, supra note 69, at 33. 
 430 Leo Katz, What We Do When We Do What We Do and Why We Do It, 37 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 753, 756 (2000). 
 431 Coase, Social Cost, supra note 68, at 2. 
 432 Sturges v. Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch. D. 852 (Eng.). 
 433 Id. 
 434 Id. 
 435 Coase, Social Cost, supra note 68, at 2. 
 436 Id. 
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er.”437 Accordingly, “[t]he real problem” presented by such a case is: “should 
A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A?”438 
Coase hypothesized that in the absence of transaction costs, private 
parties would “negotiate the efficient solution” to such problems.439 For 
even if the law’s “initial distribution” of rights was “inefficient, the parties 
[would] simply relocate it through a voluntary transaction.”440 This is so 
because between competing landholders, the enterprise that most efficiently 
used its property—i.e., generated the most profits—would buy out its less-
profitable neighbors.441 It would contract with them to “share . . . the profits 
associated with the nuisance . . . in exchange for allowing the nuisance to 
continue.”442 
Of course, transaction costs plague modern life.443 Accordingly, real-
world application of Coase’s thesis is only realized by the promulgation of 
“legal rules that . . . reduce transaction costs and provide incentives for effi-
cient . . . use [of resources].”444 Federal judge and scholar Guido Calabresi 
argued that courts should promulgate rules that produce the same outcomes 
that would result in Coase’s transaction-cost-free environment.445 As one 
commentator summarized, in Calabresi’s view, “the role of the law is to 
make rules that approximate the results in Coase’s utopia as closely and 
cheaply as possible.”446 
In some cases, equitable considerations counsel against affording a 
burdened party any remedy—for example, when someone decides to build a 
home next to an airport.447 But when equitable principles do not favor one 
                                                                                                                           
 437 Id. 
 438 Id. 
 439 Meurer, supra note 70, at 952. 
 440 Christopher Jon Sprigman et al., What’s a Name Worth?: Experimental Tests of the Value 
of Attribution in Intellectual Property, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1389, 1433 (2013). 
 441 Fisch, supra note 71, at 226 n.205; Sprigman et al., supra note 440, at 1433–34. 
 442 Dogan & Young, supra note 68, at 114 n.31. 
 443 Coase did not contend that a transaction-cost-free world is possible. Rather, he “was trying 
to demonstrate the danger of legal rules that have the opposite effect of raising transactions costs 
and of inhibiting the flow of information, two adverse conditions that combine to undermine al-
locative efficiency.” Maxwell L. Stearns, Grains of Sand or Butterfly Effect: Standing, the Legiti-
macy of Precedent, and Reflections on Hollingsworth and Windsor, 65 ALA. L. REV. 349, 378 
n.78 (2013). 
 444 Megan Hennessy, Colorado River Water Rights: Property Rights in Transition, 71 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1661, 1681 (2004). 
 445 Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 74, at 69. 
 446 Bulloch, supra note 74, at 307 n.29 (1986) (citing Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra 
note 74, at 69). 
 447 As one commentator noted: 
Permitting the homeowner to recover [in such a situation] would subject many use-
ful enterprises to extortion. People would seek out airports, industrial sites, manu-
facturing plants, farms, dumps, and all manner of vital but unpleasant commercial 
undertakings, and extort damages from them by setting up homes and day care cen-
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neighbor’s use of its property over the other’s,448 rules awarding damages to 
afflicted neighbors most closely approximate the manner in which such dis-
putes would be resolved in Coase’s transaction-cost-free environment.449 
As Calabresi observed, a polluter should be charged “with the damages 
it cause[s] and, if [it can] pay them and still stay in business,” the “market 
place” has demonstrated that “the benefits derived from” the enterprise are 
“sufficiently great to justify its existence.”450 
Conversely, if forcing the polluter to internalize the cost of its pollution 
drives it out of business, “the same effect would be achieved as when a nui-
sance is enjoined.”451 Such a result likewise reflects a judgment by the mar-
ketplace that the polluter’s enterprise was not the most economically efficient 
use of the property and its interests should yield to that of its neighbors.452 
This is so because the polluter’s prior success was premised on the fact that 
the costs resulting from the negative externalities produced by its business 
were “simply passed on to others who, by absorbing the loss, subsidize[d] 
that activity.”453 The polluter was a “free-rider”—one who enjoys all of the 
benefits of an activity while substantial costs are borne by others.454 
A legal rule awarding damages to negatively affected neighbors best 
approximates the transaction-cost-free outcome because it enables the most 
profitable of the competing enterprises to prevail, but at the same time re-
quires it to “share . . . the profits associated with the nuisance” with its 
neighbors “in exchange for allowing the nuisance to continue.”455 Such a 
rule allows the free market to determine which of the competing neighbors’ 
enterprises is most advantageous. 
                                                                                                                           
ters in their way. This is called “coming to the nuisance,” and the law bars recovery 
to such cases. Without this restriction, no enterprise would be safe, and no one 
would have an incentive to invest in necessary and otherwise profitable though un-
pleasant industries. 
Howard Gensler, Property Law as an Optimal Economic Foundation, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 62 
(1995). 
 448 See Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-to-
Farm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 87, 115 (2006) (“States interpret the com-
ing to the nuisance doctrine under traditional principles of equity.”). 
 449 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871–73 (N.Y. 1970) (awarding 
damages to homeowners exposed to “dirt, smoke, and vibration” emanating from a neighboring 
cement plant because shutting down the plant would have had a devastating impact on the local 
economy). 
 450 Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution, supra note 75, at 534–35. 
 451 Id. 
 452 See id. 
 453 Grunow, supra note 77, at 1285 n.131. 
 454 Schenck, supra note 78, at 335 (“Free-riding occurs when some parties bear the costs of an 
action, while others, the free-riders, bear no burden, but still enjoy the benefits.”). 
 455 Dogan & Young, supra note 68, at 114 n.31. 
1892 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1829 
Calabresi’s corollary to the Coase Theorem offers the best solution to 
interstate disputes concerning marijuana. It recognizes that Colorado and its 
neighbors are co-sovereigns in which the Constitution invests equal respect 
and dignity.456 Like the doctor and confectioner in Sturges v. Bridgman, 
Colorado’s marijuana-legalization experiment involves “a problem of a re-
ciprocal nature.”457 
If the Court enjoins Colorado’s experiment—as Nebraska and Okla-
homa demand—the decision will implicate Coase’s central criticism of the 
historical law of nuisance. The problem will be reduced to the question of 
whether Colorado should “be allowed to harm” its neighbors or whether 
they should “be allowed to harm [it].”458 If Colorado is allowed to proceed 
with its venture the flow of illicit marijuana across state lines will inflict 
harm on surrounding states.459 On the other hand, if its experiment is en-
joined, a sovereign choice made by the state’s voters will be thwarted.460 
The solution that best respects the sovereignty of all involved is not to pa-
ternalistically overturn Colorado’s decision, but to force it to internalize the 
cost of the externalities produced by its venture.461 Externalities, “the crea-
tion of smoke, noise, [and] smells,”462—or in the present case, dependen-
cy,463 diminished cognitive function,464 greater need for socioeconomic as-
sistance,465 crime,466 and traffic fatalities467—are transaction costs that the 
polluter should bear. The Court’s role is to fashion rules that ensure “what 
[i]s gained” by one’s use of territory “[i]s worth more than what [i]s lost.”468 
To that end, the Court should award sufficient damages to prevailing 
sister states to compensate them for the harm inflicted by Colorado’s exper-
                                                                                                                           
 456 See Kansas v. Colorado (Kansas II), 206 U.S. 46, 97–98 (1907) (“One cardinal rule, un-
derlying all the relations of the [s]tates to each other, is that of equality of right. Each [s]tate stands 
on the same level with all the rest . . . .”). 
 457 See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 68, at 2. 
 458 See id.; see also W. David Ball, Is the Nebraska/Oklahoma Pot Suit Preempted?, JURIST 
(Mar. 17, 2015), http://jurist.org/forum/2015/03/david-ball-marijuana-law.php [http://perma.cc/
Z7FP-GXBK] (“On a more basic level there are questions of equity and federalism, and it is diffi-
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Oklahoma and Nebraska, or are Oklahoma and Nebraska imposing their policies on Colorado?”). 
 459 See supra notes 182–212 and accompanying text (detailing the various harms that Colora-
do’s marijuana legalization will inflict on surrounding states). 
 460 See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (legalizing personal use and regulation of marijuana in 
Colorado). 
 461 See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 68, at 44 (detailing Coase’s Theorem for Externalities). 
 462 Id. 
 463 Volkow et al., supra note 64, at 2219. 
 464 Id. at 2221. 
 465 Id.; accord Budney & Stanger, supra note 351, at 8. 
 466 Volkow et al., supra note 64, at 2221. 
 467 See supra notes 200–208 and accompanying text (providing evidence that out-of-state 
consumers are substantially contributing to highway deaths). 
 468 Coase, Social Cost, supra note 68, at 44. 
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iment. Colorado reaped $53 million in tax revenue last year from its mariju-
ana venture.469 It is expected to collect another $69 million this year.470 Al-
lowing it to retain these profits while requiring its neighbors to shoulder the 
losses caused by that venture makes Colorado a free-rider.471 
We hope that adoption of our market-driven approach will help allevi-
ate the jurisdictional confrontations that will likely follow from state-by-
state marijuana legalization.472 If states opposing Colorado’s wide-open pot 
market are left with no other remedy “the door will be opened” to many of 
the “rivalries and reprisals” that the Constitution was designed to avert.473 
States may engage in warrantless profiling of vehicles, subjecting drivers 
suspected of carrying Colorado pot to pretextual stops.474 The Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
 469 Lobosco, supra note 367. 
 470 Josh Barro, Why Marijuana Taxes Won’t Save State Budgets, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2015), 
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perma.cc/K3HJ-FZR4]. 
 471 Admittedly, a rule forcing polluters to internalize the cost of their pollution in dollar terms 
flies in the face of traditional nuisance law, for which injunctive relief was historically the exclu-
sive remedy. Thomas W. Merrill, Is Public Nuisance a Tort?, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 17 (2011). Authori-
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tailored to match the specific economic consequences of particular conduct. Polinsky, supra, at 
1077–78. This inevitably leads to the so-called “extortion problem.” Id. This occurs when the 
“cost that enforcement of [an] injunction would impose on the defendant exceeds the loss borne 
by the plaintiff if the activity in question occurs.” Id. As one commentator explained, “[s]uppose 
. . . operation of a plant injures a pollutee by $1000 while the polluter would lose $10,000 in prof-
its if the plant were shut down by an injunction.” Id. An injunction enables the plaintiff to “exact 
compensation well in excess of his actual damages” because the defendant will “pay up to his [or 
her] entire potential profit to prevent the shutdown.” Id. In contrast, a damage award limits the 
plaintiff’s recovery to $1000, “leaving no scope for extortion.” Id. 
 472 We believe that the negotiation of binding interstate compacts between marijuana-
prohibition states and marijuana-legalization states would provide the best long-term solution to 
the extraterritorial problems posed by piecemeal marijuana legalization. “An interstate compact 
. . . is nonetheless essentially a contract between the signatory [s]tates.” Oklahoma v. New Mexi-
co, 501 U.S. 221, 242 (1991); accord Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 
2123 (2013) (“[I]nterstate compacts are construed under contract-law principles . . . .”). To be 
enforceable Congress must approve such a compact. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Given the 
often less-than-stately behavior of recent Congresses, obtaining the requisite approval might be a 
tall order. See Chad DeVeaux, The Fourth Zone of Presidential Power: Analyzing the Debt-
Ceiling Standoffs Through the Prism of Youngstown Steel, 47 CONN. L. REV. 395, 425–32 (2014) 
(discussing historically unprecedented congressional dysfunction during the Obama Administra-
tion). 
 473 See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935). 
 474 See Alison Noon, Colorado Man Sues Idaho Police Over “License-Plate Profiling” in 
Marijuana Case, DENVER POST (Mar. 29, 2014), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_25449678/
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filed the federal lawsuit Wednesday in the District of Idaho, more than a year after he said he was 
unlawfully detained and searched for marijuana on the basis of his Colorado license plates.”). 
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Court unanimously held that such stops are immune from Fourth Amend-
ment scrutiny so long as they are precipitated by the slightest infraction.475 
Anti-pot states may attempt to apply their own laws to marijuana sales 
in neighboring jurisdictions. Such extraterritorial application of state law is 
not without precedent. In its 1976 opinion in Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, the 
California Supreme Court applied the state’s dram-shop law to a Nevada 
casino in contravention of Nevada’s own law, which explicitly exempted 
alcohol vendors from such liability.476 By this logic, Nebraska could apply a 
“gram-shop act” to Colorado marijuana vendors.477 We believe that such 
extraterritorial application of state law violates the dormant Commerce 
Clause.478 But many scholars disagree with our assessment.479 Indeed, last 
July, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the Constitu-
tion permits a state to directly regulate activities beyond its borders that 
produce substantial effects within the state.480 The court addressed Supreme 
Court precedents positing that the dormant Commerce Clause “precludes 
the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly out-
side the [s]tate’s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within 
the [s]tate.”481 Belittling these precedents as “the most dormant doctrine in 
dormant [C]ommerce [C]lause jurisprudence,”482 the Tenth Circuit conclud-
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ed that they are no longer good law.483 Because this holding conflicts with 
those in other circuits, the Supreme Court will likely be called upon to re-
solve the circuit split.484  
In addition to concerns over the extraterritorial application of state law, 
we fear that denying states strongly committed to thwarting the marijuana 
trade any relief may further exacerbate the high incarceration rate in those 
states.485 “The normal method of deterring unlawful conduct is to impose an 
appropriate punishment on the person who engages in it. If the sanctions 
that presently attach to a violation . . . do not provide sufficient deterrence,” 
ordinarily lawmakers will conclude that “those sanctions should be made 
more severe.”486 Although we have misgivings about marijuana legaliza-
tion, we believe some states have overacted by imposing draconian pun-
ishments for the possession of small quantities of the drug.487 But lawmak-
ers in these states disagree with us.488 If Colorado and other states embrac-
ing the marijuana trade are given no incentive to prevent marijuana from 
spilling over their porous borders, neighboring states are likely to exact 
even more severe penalties.489 
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Adoption of our approach may ease tensions in some of the more con-
servative corners of the country by leaving it to the market to judge the mer-
its of marijuana legalization. If the Supreme Court awards a prevailing state 
damages, the success or failure of Colorado’s experiment will turn on which 
of the two competing approaches—legalization or prohibition—is most 
economically efficient. As the Supreme Court said in its very first original 
nuisance action, the outcome of such controversies should turn on “whether 
the benefit conferred” by the defendant-State’s enterprise “is not greater 
than the injury done” to the plaintiff-State.490 If, after compensating its 
neighbors for the harm it causes, Colorado still realizes a profit, the market-
place will have determined that “the benefits derived from” its venture are 
“sufficiently great to justify its existence”491 and more states will likely em-
ulate its approach. The dispute will be resolved, in effect, by awarding Col-
orado’s neighbors a “share of the profits” its pot market creates “in ex-
change for allowing the nuisance to continue.”492 The free market will have 
concluded “what [i]s gained” by the decriminalization of recreational pot 
“[i]s worth more than what [i]s lost.”493 
But if forcing Colorado to assume responsibility for the extraterritorial 
costs of its venture results in a net loss, its enterprise will prove inefficient 
and Colorado will likely decide on its own to terminate its experiment, thus 
achieving “the same effect” as if the nuisance had been enjoined in the first 
place.494 
CONCLUSION 
Popular culture—in its uncritical embrace of the pot-legalization 
movement495—all too often categorizes opponents of Colorado’s experi-
ment as prudes496 who naively view marijuana as a pestilence that makes 
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users “hear[] light and see[] sound.”497 This crude caricature belies a deeper 
and much more nuanced truth. Big Cannabis has done a remarkable job 
branding its constituents as entrepreneurs and job-creators.498 But Colora-
do’s venture is no free lunch. Marijuana is a vice, and its commercial ex-
ploitation comes at a price: dependency,499 diminished cognitive function,500 
traffic deaths,501 and organized crime.502 These externalities are accompa-
nied by transaction costs that everyone—users and nonusers—must pay: 
higher healthcare premiums,503 decreased productivity,504 greater need for 
socioeconomic assistance,505 increased burdens on our schools,506 law en-
forcement,507 and court systems,508 and more highway deaths.509 One can 
acknowledge these harmful side effects without recycling propaganda from 
the past.510 
From a policy standpoint, we express no opinion regarding whether 
marijuana legalization is a good policy choice. We simply posit that along 
with the wealth it generates, Colorado’s marijuana-legalization experiment 
produces harmful externalities that transcend the state’s borders. Under the 
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Constitution’s federalist covenant, Colorado’s right to embrace commercial 
marijuana is no greater than the right of its neighbors to be free from the 
transboundary harm Colorado pot generates. 
At the same time, we reject Nebraska’s and Oklahoma’s attempt to uti-
lize the blunt instrument of a federal injunction to commandeer Colorado’s 
legislature and police force. The best way to resolve this impasse is to allow 
Colorado to retain the policy of its choice, but force it to compensate sur-
rounding states for any damage caused. This remedy recognizes that Colo-
rado and its neighbors are co-sovereigns in whom the Constitution invests 
equal respect and dignity.511 It simply requires Colorado—the policy outli-
er—to make the extraterritorial externalities that result from its lucrative 
experiment part of its cost of doing business. Such a remedy leaves it to the 
free market to ultimately decide which of the competing states’ policies 
should prevail. 
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